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Abstract

The repeal of prohibition in Mississippi is a topic that has attracted little scholarly
attention, and even existing attention consists of a scattered and often conflicting account
of events. The purpose of this thesis is to examine and re-examine the events and players
involved in the repeal of alcohol prohibition in Mississippi in 1966. While broader issues
such as faith, society, and even race helped shape the context within which a movement
to repeal prohibition both began and succeeded, this paper will not delve into these larger
concerns any more than is necessary to understanding the significance of specific events
that led to the success of the 1966 repeal movement. A brief and basic overall history of
prohibition in Mississippi from 1908-1965 will precede the discussion of the successful
1966 repeal movement, but the emphasis will be on “brief“and “basic,” rather than on
‘overall.

The primary function ofthis piece is to describe the exact path that Mississippi

took in repealing its prohibition laws and to explain exactly why the state chose that path.
The two most oft cited significant forces in this repeal movement are a February 4, 1966
liquor raid on the Jackson Country Club and the initial leadership of Governor Paul
Johnson. Despite previous explanations of repeal that give the majority ofthe credit to
Johnson, closer examination of the repeal process clearly shows that this raid and the
resulting trials became the critical driving force behind the successful repeal of
prohibition in Mississippi.
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Introduction and Previous Repeal Movements

On April 4, 1952, a young Mississippi state senator from Corinth named Noah Sweat
stood up at a banquet at the King Edward Hotel in downtown Jackson, Mississippi, to deliver a
short oration on whiskey. The Mississippi legislature was in the midst ofits first attempt in
nearly twenty years to repeal the state’s liquor prohibition laws, and several legislators had heard
that the young senator, known affectionately as “Soggy,” had devised a new universal approach
toward this whiskey issue. At the request ofthese legislators. Sweat agreed to give a speech on
whiskey at the King Edward banquet. Sweat stood up and said, “If, when you say whiskey, you
mean the devil’s brew,the poison scourge, the bloody monster, that defiles innocence, dethrones
reason, destroys the home, creates misery and poverty... then certainly I am against it.

Sweat

then paused while roughly half ofthe audience applauded. After the applause faded. Sweat
continued, saying, “If, when you say whiskey, you mean the oil of conversation, the philosophic
wine, the ale that is consumed when good fellows get together... if you mean that drink, the sale
of which pours into our treasuries untold millions ofdollars... then certainly I am for it.

The

previously silent other half ofthe audience then erupted in a loud applause, and when those
cheers had also died down. Sweat concluded his speech by saying,“This is my stand. I will not
retreat from it. I will not compromise.

“Soggy” Sweat’s captivating doubletalk is now a relatively famous speech in the
anthology of liquor politics in Mississippi, largely due to the eloquent comedy of his words;
however, his stance on liquor in Mississippi, as overtly contradictory as it may appear, perfectly

Whiskey Speech Orator Judge “Soggy” Sweat dies,” Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 24 February,
1996, sec. B.

^Ibid.
^ Ibid.
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mirrored the sentiments of many Mississippians ofthe day and,in a way, is exactly how the state
itself had viewed liquor for years. The state of Mississippi has always had a unique relationship
with alcohol. From bootleggers, moonshiners, and drunks, to bible beaters, temperance lovers.
and staunch drys, Mississippi has experienced and continues to enjoy the entire spectrum of
stances on liquor. Even during the national episode ofliquor prohibition, Mississippi kept its
unique blend of mixed sentiments regarding liquor. The state of Mississippi had been the first
state to ratify the notorious Eighteenth Amendment,but it also became a haven for bootleggers
and moonshiners to make a living during the “Great Experiment.” For a long time, these
conflicting ideologies and circumstances echoed the mixed messages sent to Mississippi citizens
about how the state itself actually viewed intoxicating liquor. Over time, the state had exercised
varying levels ofinvolvement in the sale of liquor, but the sale of liquor had been illegal since
1908. Hazy and contradictory laws pertaining to both the prohibition and taxation of
intoxicating liquor confused many individuals both inside and outside the state borders, and it
was not until the mid 1960s that this cloud ofconfusion began to clear when the state repealed its
prohibition laws.

Today, Mississippi liquor retailers, bars, restaurants, hotels, resorts, and clubs all must
purchase their liquor jfrom the State of Mississippi. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of
the Mississippi State Tax Commission (better known as ABC)provides a 124 page list of wines
and liquors that it sells on its website firom which any licensed dealer can order cases of whatever
liquor or wine he or she desires."* ABC is the liquor wholesaler for the entire state of Mississippi,
and the intoxicating liquor industry accounted for a quarter of a billion dollars in sales at the

"* Mississippi State Tax Commission, Ojfice ofAlcoholic Beverage Control(ABC),
<http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/abc/main.htm> (10 November 2008).
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wholesale level alone in 2007.^ While this type of state-controlled business arrangement may
seem out of place in a state known for its support ofsmall government, this arrangement is one
that has stood virtually unchanged since the volatile mid 1960s.

This industry puts a large amount of money into the state’s coffers every year, and the
infrastructure that allows the state-wholesale system to work has remained almost entirely
unchanged since its inception in 1966; however, very little scholarship deals specifically with
how the current situation became the status quo. Mississippi had statewide prohibition from
1908 until 1966, but the events that led to the eventual repeal ofprohibition have remained
almost entirely unexplored. Only one M.A. thesis, written in 1992 by Clayton Sledge Allen, has
even attempted to delve into the larger history of prohibition in Mississippi and its eventual
repeal.^

Many Mississippians who lived during the prohibition era will cheerfully explain exactly
how prohibition worked in the 1950s and 60s and will offer their own reasons for why the state
eventually repealed prohibition; however, many ofthese stories sound more like folk tales than
actual history. This tendency is nowhere more frequently exposed than in the tales surrounding
the infamous raid on the Jackson Country Club in February of 1966. Although everyone who
lived in 1966 Mississippi seems to know about the raid, everyone also seems to have his or her
own version ofthe story. It is likely because ofthis confusion surrounding the facts ofthe raid
that the raid’s impact on the eventual repeal of prohibition in Mississippi warranted little
scholarly attention. Although Allen’s thesis mentions the raid as another front on which the

^ Mississippi State Tax Commission, Office ofAlcoholic Beverage Control
^ Clayton Sledge Allen. “The Repeal of Prohibition in Mississippi”(M.A. Thesis, University of
Mississippi, 1992).
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state’s prohibition laws came under attack, he gives the majority ofthe credit to Governor Paul
Johnson’s efforts to lead the state to repeal its legislation.^

While Johnson certainly played a part in the eventual repeal ofprohibition, he did not
focus his leadership specifically on repeal. Instead, he directed his efforts toward resolving what
he and others saw as decades of hypocrisy. The raid on the Jackson Country Club and especially
the ensuing trials did more to alarm the power structme of Mississippi and to spur the legislature
into action than Governor Johnson ever did. Newspaper reports firom the era, eyewitness
accounts and testimonies, and logical interpretations ofthe simple chronology of events show
that the raid on the Jackson Country Club was the single most important, although by no means
the only, catalyst for the repeal of prohibition in Mississippi.

In 1959, the state of Oklahoma officially ended state prohibition, leaving Mississippi as
the sole remaining adherent to state-mandated prohibition ofliquor. Mississippi had had
prohibition on the books in some form or another since 1908, and it became the first state to
ratify the notorious 18* Amendment, doing so in less than 20 minutes. Despite the state’s best
efforts, the 21®^ Amendment later ended the national experiment with prohibition in 1933, and
once again returned to letting the states decide whether or not to allow alcohol to flow within its
borders. The state of Mississippi chose to continue the noble experiment, if only within its own
borders.

Four attempts to repeal prohibition in Mississippi predated the eventual successful repeal
in 1966. The first attempt came promptly on the heels ofthe 21^^ Amendment, when the state
legislature passed a bill in 1934 that called for a popular referendum. Ifthe majority of

^ Allen,“The Repeal ofProhibition in Mississippi.
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Mississippians were to vote wet, then individual counties, in which voting majorities desired to
have liquor, could have one state-owned liquor store per county. The dry forces won a
resounding victory in the referendum, wining by a near three to one ratio, with only fourteen of
the state’s eighty-two counties voting wet.^ With this near total victory for the forces of
temperance, it is not surprising that it would take some time to muster the support for another
repeal campaign.

The next attempt at repeal came almost twenty years after the initial attempt. In 1952,
Governor Hugh White called for the repeal ofthe black market tax on liquor, which was a
particularly shameful aspect ofthe liquor laws of Mississippi. The legislature promptly churned
out a bill similar to the 1934 bill, which also included a referendum. In the meantime,the liquor
situation during this repeal attempt quickly began to take a turn for the absurd. The National
Guard began conducting raids up and down the Mississippi Gulf Coast before the referendum,
and the personal attacks between wets and drys resembled the fiercest ofthe modem smear
campaigns.^ The Jackson Daily News reported that the wets were winning their particular straw
polls, but on the day ofreckoning, the voters again staggered to the polls to vote dry, this time
10

with a one and a half to one ratio.

The 1960 attempt at repeal came about under some rather distinctive circumstances. The
state’s taxation procedures for alcohol had grown vastly more sophisticated since the 1952 repeal
attempt, and people in general knew far more about the specifics ofthe liquor situation in
Mississippi. Furthermore, Oklahoma’s repeal in 1959 had left Mississippi as the only surviving
dry state, and people across the nation had noticed. In a 1959 Newsweek article, the magazine
8

Allen, 28 & 42.
^ Allen, 33.
10
Allen, 41.
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reported that twelve ofthe state’s counties were overtly wet with extralegal options,“and even
when the governor visits, the bartenders interrupt their work only long enough to propose toasts;
and in the other seventy counties a bootlegger is about as hard to find as a magnolia bloom in

April.

People had begun to think that liquor was legal in all but name only in Mississippi, and

this mentality eventually served as the catalyst for the 1960 repeal campaign.

In 1960, one enterprising Mississippian attempted to sue the IRS for tax deductions,
saying that he should receive exemptions for liquor he bought for and gave to his clients. The
case went to the United States Supreme Court and the court ruled that the man had no claim to
these deductions because liquor was illegal in Mississippi. This ruling, and the attention it
received, subsequently re-awakened the liquor question and inevitable concerns surroimding its
hypocrisy. A bill passed the Senate but stalled in the House due to a combination ofintralegislative fighting as well as the murder of a Marion County Sheriff by bootleggers. After this
killing, very few politicians wanted to be seen as on the side ofliquor, and the House
consequently voted down a local option bill with no referendum three times in the 1960
12

legislative term.

The last unsuccessful attempt to repeal prohibition in Mississippi came in 1964. Both
houses of the legislature passed a bill with a referendum on the liquor issue. The referendum had
two questions: whether or not to repeal Mississippi’s prohibition law, and in the event ofrepeal,
if the new law should provide for state-owned or private-owned liquor stores. While Governor
Johnson agreed with the referendum in the bill and the overall need to rectify Mississippi’s
liquor situation, he vetoed the 1964 bill over an issue regarding the referendum itself Only those

11
12

“The Last Drinking ‘Drys,’” Newsweek. 20 April 1959.
Allen, 51-52.
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individuals who voted wet could vote on the second part ofthe referendum. In the eyes of many
drys, including Johnson, this requirement gave an imfair advantage to wets in both recruiting
neutral votes and in deciding the future of liquor in Mississippi ifthe state voted to repeal
prohibition. Allen also points out that the civil rights issues of 1964 simply overshadowed the
liquor issue too much to allow for any real attempt to repeal prohibition to succeed.

Civil rights issues certainly continued to dominate Mississippi’s political and social
worlds, but people had not lost sight ofthe liquor issue. Previous repeal campaigns showed that
people had concerns about the image ofthe state, especially regarding the apparent hypocrisy.
The details ofthe liquor situation in Mississippi were embarrassing for many ofthe state’s
citizens. In December of 1965, less than one month prior to the introduction of several January
legislative measures dealing with liquor, the Wall Street Journal ran a story about a fictional
fireman named Tom fi*om New York who was traveling from state to state to sample each
locale’s liquor laws. In the story, Tom flies into Biloxi, Mississippi, and despite his prior
knowledge that Mississippi still has prohibition, he would have never guessed that prohibition
existed. Tom spent his time “drinking the night away in the neon tangle of bars and nightclubs
in Biloxi; the town goes full throttle and the law looks the other way- the reason?” asks Tom.
»»13

“Mississippi has arrived at a convenient and profitable arrangement with its conscience.

1965 came and went with relatively no concerted effort to repeal prohibition, but 1966
would bring with it a renewed resolve by many individuals to rectify the hypocrisy that tarnished
Mississippi’s liquor laws. In mid January, Senator Bill Carraway of Leland introduced a bill into
the Senate calling for bone-dry enforcement of prohibition. Carraway, however, was not a dry.

13

‘Liquor & the Law: Some Barriers To Drinking Fall, but Many Linger,” Wall Street Journal,
23 December, 1965, pp. 6.
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and while this measure may not seem like an attempt to repeal prohibition, its real purpose was
14

to simply prod the legislature into some sort ofreactionary action against prohibition.
Representative Phil Bryant of Oxford also introduced a bill into the House in early January,
which called for local-option liquor with no referendum. The Jackson Daily News even ran a
15

poll that showed a general favoritism towards repeal of prohibition,

What do these types of

measures reveal? Simply that pressure was rising in 1966 for a resolution to the liquor situation
in Mississippi. The actions and events beginning in February of 1966 would both seek and lead
>5

to an end to Mississippi’s “profitable arrangement.

14
15

Allen, 58.
Allen, 60.

8
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Governor Johnson’s Initial Proposal

The first episode in the drama that eventually led to the repeal of prohibition in
Mississippi came in early February of 1966. Local papers such as the Jackson Daily News and
the Jackson Clarion-Ledger reported speculations that Governor Johnson might address the
current liquor situation in an upcoming speech to the Mississippi legislaUire, saying that he had
16

hinted to some restaurant-goers that they might do so.

Sure enough, on February 2"^, the very

day ofthe previous printing, Johnson delivered a speech in front ofthe Legislature “addressing’
the liquor situation.

Johnson called the current hypocritical liquor situation in Mississippi deplorable, saying
that it had disturbed him deeply.

Despite the fact that Johnson had vetoed a bill to end

prohibition two years earlier, he urged the legislature to call for a referendum to be held on
March 15* so that the voters of the state could decide once and for all whether to continue with
18
prohibition, and he provided a plan for either outcome, If the state voted to remain dry, his plan

entailed simply that the legislature provide him with the resoiuces, as Johnson said, to dry up
[the] state like the Sahara Desert.”^^ If, on the other hand, the majority of voters chose to end
prohibition, then each county would have the opportunity to choose, by voting, whether or not to
be wet or remain dry.

According to Johnson’s plan, if the coimty voted dry, then the status quo would remain
intact for that county and liquor would continue to be illegal within its boundaries. If, however,
a county voted wet, then the state government would authorize liquor dealers in that county to
16

Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 2, 1966, sec. A.- furthermore.
Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 3, 1966, sec. C.
18
Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 3,1966, sec. A.
19
Ibid.
17
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sell liquor for a minimum offour years. Johnson’s wet plan also called for the creation of a State
20

Alcohol Control Commission and assigned to it the duty of collecting a tax on the liquor.

In

the event ofrepeal, liquor sales within the state of Mississippi were to take place in state-owned
package stores under the supervision ofthe State Alcohol Control Commission. Restaurants,
hotels, resorts, and tourist attractions that received licenses were the exceptions to this
requirement under Johnson’s plan.

This speech was an unprecedented move on the part of Governor Johnson. Governor
Hugh White had denounced prohibition when,in 1955, he called for a state police force to fix the
21

racially driven enforcement of prohibition laws at the time,

However,in the 58-year history of

statewide prohibition, no governor had ever publicly gone before the legislature, been forthright
and honest about the need to fix the hypocrisy ofthe liquor situation, and included a possible end
to prohibition as a solution to its problems. Several newspapers across the nation such as the
Chicago Tribune, and Atlanta Journal Constitution ran features describing this speech, and the
New York Times even ran a front-page article summarizing the speech and its context. Most of
the national attention focused on revealing the uniqueness ofJohnson’s action among the
pantheon of past governors of Mississippi, and while the media attention certainly lent itself
nicely to strengthening Johnson’s zealous treatment ofthe liquor issue, some of these outlets
misrepresented or at least skewed a key aspect of Johnson’s speech. The New York Times
reported,“Mr. Johnson became the first governor of Mississippi since prohibition was enacted
by the state... to stand before the legislature and urge repeal.” Headlines such as Mississippi
Asked to Legalize Liquor,” which appeared in the Atlanta Journal Constitution, made it seem as

20

This was ironic because another existing agency already taxed the illegal commodity at the
time ofthe speech.
21
‘Yes, It is a Farce,” Jackson Daily News,2 February 1955.
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though the governor was calling for a repeal of prohibition, when in fact he was merely calling
for positive action to end a specific hypocrisy.

The majority ofthe legislature approved ofJohnson’s speech for what one legislator
described as its “intestinal fortitude.”^^ Senator Bill Carraway of Leland, who already had a bill
on the floor calling for more stringent enforcement of prohibition laws, said “it was the most
»»23

statesman-like speech I have ever heard.

Senator Hayden Campbell of Jackson was elated

that “at last a Governor ofthe state has taken the leadership to correct the most deplorable
»»24

situation that has ever existed in any state,

However, as usual, not everyone in the legislature

shared those euphoric sentiments about the ideas presented by Johnson in his speech. Senators
like Sonny Montgomery and T.G. McCormick agreed with the need to address the liquor issue
but had concerns over specifics. One potentially divisive issue among the wets was the manner
in which liquor was to be sold. Several legislators disagreed with the notion of state-controlled
liquor sales and worried about the potentially negative consequences of having the state
involving itselfin the sale ofthis “evil” item. The issue ofthe referendum itself, which became
extremely crucial later on, also came up for consideration in these early stages. Several senators,
such as McCormick and John Clarke Love, who had disagreements on the specifics, still
„25

supported the referendum, because, as McCormick said,“when the people vote, that’s it.
the other hand, other legislators who correctly saw this matter as not a constitutional one
questioned the validity or the need for a referendum.

22

Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 3, 1966, sec. C.
Various Articles, Jackson Daily News, Feb. 3, 1966, pp. 13.
24
Ibid.
23

25

Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 3, 1966, sec. C.

On
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Editorials in the ensuing days’ local newspapers mirrored the mixed sentiments ofthe
legislators. The typical dry supporters such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Society, The
Baptist Record^ and other religious groups remained intact and entrenched. Editorials and
headlines in The Baptist Record remained unwavering in their adherence to the philosophy that
26

Mississippi needed to address the liquor situation but legalization was not the answer,

Other

groups expressed satisfaction at Johnson’s proposal. Organizations such as the state Mississippi
Association of Sheriffs supported Johnson’s plan. Charlie Capps ofBolivar, president ofthis
»27

group stated simply,“I think it’s great; it’s all we want in law enforcement.

Concerns also

arose over the power of the fewer but heavily populated counties, which, at the time, were much
more likely to vote strongly in favor ofrepealing prohibition, to swing the overall vote in their
28

favor.

The overall effect of Johnson’s speech was to put the liquor issue at the forefront of
politics and drive it to the front of everyone’s mind. He made it very clear that he expected the
legislature to give this issue top priority in the coming weeks, and he knowingly went out on a
limb to do so. Johnson, who won the gubernatorial election running on a platform that included
an anti-local option liquor component, had proclaimed that ifthe voters ofthe state wished, he
would be willing to implement a program of local option liquor. This type of politically risky
maneuver echoed the strong desire of Johnson to actually end the hypocrisy ofthe laws, and to
salvage the image ofthe state as far as liquor went. Responses to Johnson reflected an awareness
of his genuine desire to end hypocrisy, and individual acclamations for the speech’s courage
were too numerous to count. However, even though a number of legislators and citizens

26
27

Various Articles, The Baptist Record, Feb. 10,1966, pp. 1.
Ibid.

28

Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 4, 1966, sec. A.
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showered praise on Johnson for the general idea and the political risk he was willing to take, they
still held back jfrom agreeing with the means he had presented to solve the liquor problem in
Mississippi. Given this backdrop, the events ofFebruary 4*, 1966 became markedly more
significant.

Green 14

The Raid on Jackson Country Club

In the eyes of many capital city residents, the Junior League of Jackson’s annual Carnival
Ball was the social event ofthe season. The guest list was a who’s who ofboth city and state
elites coming from both the political and corporate worlds. The actual Carnival Ball itself was
held downtown in the city auditorium, but the king’s reception was being held at the Jackson
Country Club. At this reception, guests could expect to enjoy some ofthe king’s champagne as
well as the privilege of purchasing liquor drinks from the bar’s vast and varied selection. This
liquor, belonging figuratively to that year’s King, Warren A. Hood,became the target ofa raid,
29

which became central to the repeal of prohibition in Mississippi.

The events that drove Hinds County Chief Deputy Tom Shelton into making the raid on
Jackson Country Club are not particularly well documented, but many ofthem seem to have
been well known. In the months prior to the 1966 Carnival Ball, Shelton had been in the process
of attempting to actually enforce the state’s prohibition laws within his jurisdiction. Shelton was
what amounted to a life-long law enforcement officer, having previously been the Sheriff of
Union County before coming to the capitol city where he eventually became chief deputy sheriff
in Hinds County in March of 1965.^^ While nominally he was only a deputy, he was serving as
acting sheriff because the elected sheriff, Fred Pickett, was temporarily incapacitated due to the
rather ironic fact that he had a drinking problem.

29 It should be noted that “liquor” referred to hard liquors or wines over 4% by volume; i.e. no
beer. Beer was allowed in Mississippi by local county option.
John Maines,“Raid on Jackson Country Club Led to Legalized Liquor Sales,” Clarion14 September 1986, sec. H.
Ledger,
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In his new role as acting sheriff, Shelton, along with a few other Hinds County Deputies,
had been raiding county roadhouses outside ofthe city.^^ These raids remained outside the city,
because, as Shelton would later note, there was an understanding between city police and county
police that each would handle its own business, with county police staying out ofthe city of
Jackson.^^ Shelton was slowly gaining a reputation for bold raids, and according to later
33

testimonies. Hinds County liquor sales had significantly dropped,

As the number ofthese

raids increased and as county roadhouses began to shut down in larger numbers,the owners of
the roadhouses began to complain to Shelton that he was discriminating in his choice oflocations
where he conducted his raids.

The raids, by virtue ofthe understood agreement between city and county officials, were
taking place well outside ofthe city, thus avoiding the bigger, wealthier clubs within or very near
the city of Jackson. Shelton, in the eyes oflocal attorney Richard Dortch “was picking the low
,»34

hanging fhiit.

Furthermore, virtually all ofthe roadhouses that Shelton targeted, according to
35

William Winter, were owned,operated, and frequented by the local black population,

Whether

or not it was the racial, economic, or geographic discrimination that hit home with Shelton the
hardest, these complaints, combined with a genuine desire to enforce prohibition, convinced
36

Shelton to go after the wealthier, and white, country clubs in his liquor raids.

He wanted to

31

Richard Dortch, interview by author, tape recording, Jackson, Miss.,27 September 2008; and
William Winter, interview by author, tape recording, Jackson, Miss., 25 October 2008.
State ofMississippi vs. Charles Wood, 187 So.2d 820,1966- pp. 620. All testimony cited
comes fi-om the initial case. Hinds County V5. Charles Wood, but this testimony exists under the
name
ofthe Supreme Court case rather than the county court case.
33
State ofMississippi v.y. Charles Wood,656.
34
Interview with Richard Dortch.
35
Interview with William Winter.
36

Maine {Clarion-Ledger Sept. 14,1986)- Shelton mentions that he wishes prohibition was still
in effect, saying, “It would be nice if we could pour all the alcohol in the ocean and throw the
recipe in with it.”
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apply the law with an even hand, and he chose the night ofthe premier social event ofthe season
as the place to start. After all, remarked Dortch later,“What better way to press that point to the
people of high social status than to raid them at their most vulnerable moment.”^^

According to the Jackson Clarion-Ledger,the raid began around 7:00 pm on the night of
February 4^^ 1966, when Hinds County ChiefDeputy Sherriff Tom Shelton, accompanied by
deputies Bob Fasano, Bill Russell, and Bill Gordo, began to demand that they be allowed to
search the Jackson Country Club for whiskey.^* At this time, no guests had arrived, and the
club’s assistant manager, Charles Wood and president, Edmund “Ed” Brunini, were among the
few individuals present to greet the raiders. According to George Hewes m,longtime fiiend and
associate of Ed Brunini, an employee ofthe club had tipped off Tom Shelton that whiskey and
other hard liquors would be present at the reception.^^ Brunini knew that champagne was in the
kitchen being iced down for the reception, and it is likely that much ofthe metro Jackson
population also knew it. The deputies quickly found this champagne, seized it, and promptly
loaded it into trucks.

At this point, all was going according to plan as far as Shelton was concerned. He had
quickly seized the champagne, which everyone knew would be there, and it appeared as though
he was well on his way to achieving his goal ofsending a message to the capital city VIPs that he
would hold them equally accountable in the eyes ofthe law. Furthermore, he had done all ofthis
before any guests had arrived, thus avoiding any confrontation. Shelton, however, knew from a
staff informant, and probably suspected on his own,that a store ofhard liquor was still

37
38
39

Interview with Richard Dortch.
Various Articles, Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 5,1966, sec. A.
George Hewes,Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes and Predecessor Firms: A History
(Jackson, MS,2002), 103.
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somewhere on the premises. Unfortunately for the deputies, this liquor was either well hidden,
or behind some locked door. Either way,the opportunity to stall the deputy was clearly present.

Richard Dortch was a young attorney who had been with Ed Brunini’s firm,Brunini,
Everett, Grantham,& Quin(now Brunini, Grantham, Grower,& Hewes)since 1961. On the
night of the raid, Dortch received a phone call firom Ed Brunini,inviting him come to the
Jackson Country Club with a cash bail bond in pocket, but as Dortch himself noted,“This was
»»40

not a request.

Dortch arrived at the country club shortly after the deputies had arrived, but

well before any ofthe alcohol had been seized. Brunini gave Dortch strict instructions to
shadow him all night so that if arrested, which Brunini felt he would be, Dortch could
41

immediately go and bail him out ofjail.

This assignment put Dortch in a unique position where

he had the opportunity to witness the events ofthe raid virtually from start to finish.

When Shelton decided to start looking for the whiskey, the first person he went to was Ed
Brunini. Shelton asked him where the liquor was and for keys to all the rooms in the country
club, to which Brunini replied that Shelton was an uninvited guest, would receive no help from
42

Brunini himself, and definitely would not get his hands on any keys,

Charles Wood later

would say that he had the key all along, but was under orders from superiors, likely Brunini, not
to turn it over to authorities.

43

According to Shelton, Wood and his superiors kept telling him

that the club manager, who was reportedly home with heart troubles, was in possession ofthe

40

Interview with Richard Dortch.
Ibid.
42
Ibid
41

43

Maine {Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 14, 1986).
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only key, and that “they were afraid ifthey told him what was going on, he would have a heart
attack and all that malarkey.

Regardless of who exactly had the key, Shelton had received an elaborately terse “no” to
his request for the key, so he proceeded to start looking for the liquor himself. According to
Hewes, Shelton’s informant recommended that the deputies search a small shed at the base ofthe
45

golf-ball decorated water tower that dominates the skyline at the country club.

The deputies

did just that, and they would not leave the water tower empty handed. They began to carry off
several cases of what they thought was liquor, but when one enterprising deputy had the idea to
actually open up the wooden case, Shelton discovered that he and his men were carrying off
46

several cases of non-alcoholic Catawba sparkling grape juice.

Understandably furious, Shelton

went back to searching, and eventually surmised that ifthere was any alcohol on the premises, it
would likely be in a small room behind the bar. Considering that no one was in any mood to
surrender the keys, Shelton decided that he would have to break the down the door. The problem
with this new strategy, according to Dortch, was that neither Shelton, nor any of his deputies had
47

remembered to bring an axe to a liquor raid.

Shelton now faced a choice: either let the

situation lie as it was and leave with the champagne, or go back to the police station to get an
axe. He chose to go back for the axe.

By the time Shelton’s men returned and began the process ofsmashing down doors,
many of the guests had begun to arrive from the Carnival Ball. According to papers and
eyewitnesses, the sounds ofthe door smashing reverberated quite memorably through the lobby
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ofthe Jackson Country Club.

The deputies found the liquor and wanted to transfer it as

quickly as possible from the barroom to their trucks. In one final tour de force ofpolitical
drama, Brunini refused Shelton’s repeated pleas to unlock the club’s back doors to allow the
deputies to remove the liquor incognito. According to Hewes, Brunini firmly told Shelton “you
»49

came in through the front door and you go back the same way.

Given this one path, the

deputies began carrying the liquor outside, and this final phase of Shelton’s now somewhat
flawed operation took on a certain level of dramatic flare. “I don’t know exactly how it
happened,” Dortch recalled,“but the crowd formed a double line like a gauntlet, and the deputy
sheriffs had to walk that gauntlet to get the liquor out to their truck, and the comments that were
»,50

made to them are not something I would want to repeat.

Newspapers confirmed that the guests were very unhappy at the turn of events, which had
ruined their party. The Jackson socialites hurled a variety ofinsults toward Shelton and his
51

deputies. “One woman called me dictator Hitler,” Shelton recalled.

The Associated Press

reported in several papers that one man even tripped Deputy Bob Fasano as he was carrying the
liquor out ofthe country club. Fasano promptly arrested the man, and then recognized the
tripper as a man he had previously arrested on the especially appropriate charge of driving while
52

intoxicated.

The deputies even had to carry the cases past Governor Johnson, who was a guest

at the reception. Johnson began to head for the door when a woman grabbed him and asked him
if he could do anything about the situation. Johnson reportedly replied,“I made my stand, I took
48
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my chance.

Shelton himself later recalled that Governor Johnson was very cordial toward the

deputies, informing any irate guest begging him to save their party that Shelton “wasjust doing
»54

his sworn duty.

Despite the understandable anger at the situation, the party went on despite the
sigmficant change of plan. As the deputies left, several guests, displaying an admirable sense of
humor about the whole situation, raised their glasses, toasted to the deputies, and finished
whatever drinks they had managed to salvage.^^ Shelton arrested Charles Wood for possession
of what amounted to roughly $10,000 worth ofillegal liquor, but Richard Dortch, who had no
idea how to write a bail bond, prepared one for Charles Wood,thus preventing him fi*om ever
seeing the inside of a jail.^^ As Wood later reported, the party went on until two in the morning,
all the beer having been drunk within about ten minutes.^^ Fortunately for the partygoers, the bar
still had a hefty stock of non-alcoholic sparkling Catawba grape juice, courtesy ofthe Hinds
County Sheriffs Department. One guest later remarked,“It was the most subdued carnival
»,58

reception fve ever attended.

The results of this raid, given the social and political background within which it took
place, were, needless to say, dramatic. This drama was likely the catalyst to several conspiracy
theory rumors that Brunini, or even Governor Johnson,knew about the raid prior to its
59

occurrence.

The notion that Governor Johnson knew about this raid seems unlikely, and both
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Governor Winter and Dortch doubt the Governor knew anything,60 Furthermore, Shelton said
that his decision to raid the country club had nothing to do with the Governor’s speech two days
prior to the raid, and he also maintained that he had not told anyone what he was planning. On
the night of ball itself, he simply told four deputies to meet him at the station without informing
61

them of the reason.

Initial appearances suggest that Brunini did not know about this raid in advance, but a
closer examination of the context, combined with later testimony and various other factors
suggests that he did know about the raid in advance. The overall shock that resulted from this
raid lends itself to the idea that no on could have seen this coming. Hewes points out that nearly
everyone found it inconceivable that any official would “mess up” the Carnival Ball, and Hewes
62

surmised that Brunini might have shared this feeling.

However, while most individuals simply

chose to lean on this feeling of security, Brunini chose to act on them by destroying them with
this raid. Even the timing of the event seems to have lent itself, at the very least, to a strong
suspicion that a raid might occur. The Governor had made a speech two days prior denouncing
the hypocrisy of enforcing prohibition, Shelton had been increasing his own efforts to dry up
Hinds County, and complaints that enforcement efforts had been avoiding the so-called “big
dogs” were increasing. Jackson Country Club was not within the city limits of Jackson, so a
surprise raid was certainly not inconceivable. A combination ofthis backdrop, eyewitness
accounts, secondary sources, and accounts of Brunini by his personal friends, including his own
son, show that he not only knew about the raid, but he invited it.^^
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When Tom Shelton became acting Hinds County Sherriff, he made a trip to all the
country clubs in his jurisdiction to inform them of his plans to begin cracking down on the sale
ofintoxicating liquor. Accordingly, Brunini ordered that all members clear out their lockers of
any liquor once Shelton made it clear that he was going to start cracking down on prohibition
64

violators.

Nevertheless, once the Carnival Ball rolled around, he agreed to allow champagne to

be served at the reception. The state’s prohibition laws restricted both champagne and liquor,
and as it turned out, Shelton seized both. The possibility that this action was a totally random
miscalculation of the law is quite simply too problematic and very unhkely.

Ed Brunini was an immensely talented and well-respected, Georgetown educated
attorney with a reputation as a consummate organizer, and he certainly had very few issues, if
any, in misunderstanding a law with which the state of Mississippi was so closely associated.
Brunini was an exceptionally civic-minded individual who,according to Hewes,Dortch, and
Winter, had wanted prohibition repealed for some time. Given this combination oftalent within
the sphere of the law, and a desire to see the law repealed, the notion that Brunini simply slipped
up in this instance seems questionable. Furthermore, as Hewes, noted, Brunini was a confidant
of senators,judges, governors, legislators, and all types ofpolitical figures, so he had a generally
65

accurate feel for the many aspects of political life in Mississippi,

Shelton had known for some

time that the country club was serving liquor, and Brunini’s eyes were surely wide open to the
66

fact that most everyone knew that the country club normally had liquor,

His eyes, along with

the eyes of every other capitol city resident, were also open to the fact that Shelton, for some
time, had been conducting these bold raids to seize liquor. According to Dortch and Ed Brunini
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Jr., Brunini, Sr. used Shelton’s stalwart desire to rid Hinds County ofliquor to manipulate
Shelton into raiding the Jackson Country Club on the night ofthe Carnival Ball.

Brunini, Jr. says that his father allowed information that the Jackson Country Club would
67

be serving liquor at the Carnival Ball reception to “leak” into Shelton’s office,

Having

witnessed the crackdown on liquor Shelton was initiating in Hinds County, Brunini knew the
man’s determination, almost to the point of stubbornness, to rid the coimty ofliquor. Given the
knowledge ofthe man’s character, Brunini correctly surmised that if Shelton received
information that all but invited a raid on the Jackson Country Club on the night of Carnival Ball,
68

that Shelton would be only too happy to oblige.

While Brunini, Jr. did not recall exactly how his father supplied information to Shelton,
the most likely method was that Brunini used the country club staff member that Hewes
mentioned to let Shelton know that the country club was selling liquor. Considering that Shelton
had a staff informant at the raid, a staffinformant who supplied Shelton with a false lead that the
hard liquor was under the water tower, it is a fair assumption that Shelton’s staffinformant was
actually working for Brunini. Shelton reported that he knew that the country club had been
selling liquor for some time, so Brunini’s request that country club members clear out their
lockers until the Carnival Ball also makes sense. If Shelton had decided to raid the country
immediately after receiving this “leaked” information, then the police would find no liquor as
long as members complied with Brunini’s orders. However, on the night of the Carnival Ball,
Brunini allowed champagne and liquor, and this staff informant almost surely let Shelton know
as well.
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George Hewes’s account ofevents places Brunini at the club only after club manager,
Charles Wood, called him at home around 6:30 or 7:00 to inform him that Shelton and
accompanying deputies had arrived and were demanding to search for whiskey.^^ If Shelton had
arrived at the country club to carry out what he thought was going to be a surprise raid and found
the club’s president waiting for him, Shelton probably would have known something was amiss.
After all, why would someone like Brunini, who surely had an invitation to the social event of
the season, be at the country club, when the Carnival Ball itself was about to begin? For his part.
Governor Winter, who also was present at the raid, said that he was “almost positive that Ed
Brunini knew about it” well before the raid had even begun, and he had a strong suspicion that
70

Brunini had a hand in planning it.

Dortch agrees that Brunini knew that the raid was coming

and that his presence at the country club at or soon after the beginning ofthe raid is also
indicative of prior knowledge ofthe raid. As Dortch himselfremarked,“I don’t think he was
»71

there just by happenstance.

Brunini wanted to get to the country club quickly to handle any potential situation, but
he did not want to be at the scene ofthe raid until after the police had arrived. His presence at
the raid before it had begun would arouse immediate and lasting suspicion ofconspiracy. By all
accounts, Brunini was a man who liked to work behind the scenes, and he worked very hard to
keep his name out the newspapers.^^ Consequently, in the entire media coverage of this raid,
lasting over several months, his name appeared only one time, and only as a side not that
mentioned him as the president ofthe Jackson Country Club. This relative anonymity as a
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master planner of the raid later allowed Brunini to continue to work behind the scenes in the
negotiation process ofthe legislature, a process that eventually led to the repeal of prohibition.

Even more impressive than the initial planning ofthis raid was the way in which Brunini
further manipulated Shelton, in accordance with the situation, to attain a desired result. Once
Brunini realized that the raid was in progress, he acted with remarkable skill. Brunini saw this
raid as an opportunity to confront the state prohibition laws with its own hypocrisies, even if it
meant that officers would have to place Brunini himself under arrest. Every action Brunini took
during the entire course of this raid worked towards the ultimate goal of creating as big of a show
as possible. As a precaution to arrest, Brunim, always the consummate organizer, called Richard
Dortch and asked him to come to the Country Club with a bail-bond in cash and then to shadow
him the entire night. Dortch believes that Brunini asked him specifically because of his nonmember status at the time, which meant that he had no stake in the alcohol and thus could not be
73

arrested under the prohibition laws.

Shelton’s plan was to get in and out quickly, because, as
,,74

Shelton himself said, he “intended to have no publicity at all.

The success of Shelton’s plan

depended upon getting the job done before the guests arrived, “so that,” as Hewes noted later,
he could get his desired publicity without a flare back.”^^ This flare back was precisely what
Brunini had in mind.

When asked to describe the idea that an establishment like the Jackson Country Club
would be raided on the night ofthe 1966 Carnival Ball, Richard Dortch’s response was simple:
„76

Unthinkable.
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Charles Wood echoed this sentiment, saying,“Yeah,I was shocked... all the
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clubs had alcohol back then; the only times you were careful was when grand jury was in
session.„77 Shelton wanted to shock the Jackson elites. He wanted them to realize that the law
would be applied with an even hand; however, he expressly did not want them to see him do it in
person. Ed Brunini did.

Brunini wanted the event to be dramatic and to stay in people’s minds, so he stalled,
forcing Shelton to ruin the party in front ofthe guests. Dortch also recalls wondering exactly
why Brunini refused to give the keys to Shelton. The alternative, in Dortch’s eyes, was that the
deputies would smash down the door behind the bar, and as the president ofJackson Country
(4

Club, this action was thoroughly undesirable for Brunini. I later realized,” Dortch admits,“that
»,78

breaking the door down was exactly what Ed Brunini wanted to happen,

Listening to

sledgehammers and axes smash away at a door to get the alcohol was far more impressive than
simply unlocking the door, and it also causes people to get more upset at the situation. By
essentially daring the deputies to smash down the doors, Brunini simply added some more fuel to
an event already flying with angry sparks. When the time was right, Brunini finally ignited all
the ingredients when he forced the deputies to walk back out through the gauntlet of angry
»79

partygoers. As Dortch notes,“That anger was what Ed Brunini was counting on.

Brunini,

and other anti-prohibitionists, knew that people would need to feel uncomfortable about the
alcohol situation in order to change it. Arresting the Jackson Country Club’s assistant manager,
and generally angering the political and social elites ofthe capital city was a sure way to make
people uncomfortable.
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If Governor Johnson’s speech denouncing the h}^ocrisy of Mississippi’s prohibition laws
received national exposure, this raid, an irresistibly made-for-the-media event, occurring only
two days after Johnson’s speech, garnered even more attention from both local and national news
sources. As expected, the Jackson Clarion-Ledger and Jackson Daily News ran the story on the
front pages for several days as more details came out about the event and covered the
developments in detail. Regional and national newspapers also picked up on this sensational
story, and it allowed them the second opportunity in as many days two comment on the state of
Mississippi s liquor laws. The Richmond, Virginia Times Dispatch ran a story on the raid on
February 6"^, focusing especially on the governor’s involvement.^® The New York Times, linking
it to the already published front page article about Johnson’s speech, ran the headline “Governor
81

Johnson at Ball Raided in Jackson” on the front page.

The Chicago Tribune ran its story on

page three, with the headline reading ‘Governor Helpless as Deputies Cart Away Chanty Ball
,»82

Liquor.
ran a

The Washington Post also ran a story on page three, and even the Los Angeles Times

summary of events on page six oftheir February 6^ edition.^^

The common characteristic of these stories, beyond the fact that they all drew from
basically the same Associated Press source, was that they focused much more on the role of
Governor Johnson in the raid than did the local papers. Three out ofthe previous four national
newspapers ran headlines featuring the word “governor” somewhere. Given the recent speech
Johnson had made, these national news outlets saw the ironic situation ofa Governor being
80
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present, on the wrong side, at a liquor raid only days after denouncing the hypocrisy of
prohibition laws. These sources almost universally quoted some part ofJohnson’s speech where
he attacked how the prohibition laws were a sham and how the governor was unable to do
anything to prevent Shelton from seizing the liquor.

The dramatic raid itself, which The Chicago Tribune described as the ‘Veirdest chapter’
in the state’s liquor history, allowed national media outlets to give a brieftake on the nature of
Mississippi’s liquor laws, and they took the opportunity to make the hypocrisy oftheir
84

enforcement very apparent.

These national newspapers described the state as having a “hide-

and-seek liquor prohibition history” and a “peculiar brand of extra-legal local option despite the
»85

statewide ban.

The New York Times in particular deftly pointed out the hypocrisy when it

reported that the arrival ofthe sheriff, warrant in hand, was indicative ofthe class ofopinion in
Mississippi, which has legal prohibition, but a great deal ofillegal liquor.»)86
The rest of the nation saw these closely related events: Johnson’s call for an end to the
prohibition farce and the Jackson Country Club raid; and even to the untrained eye, the hypocrisy
ofthe liquor laws of Mississippi, as encapsulated by these two events, was inescapable. This
type of attention was essential to the growth of a repeal movement in Mississippi. The more
people who became aware of the effect events like this had on the image of Mississippi, the more
people would jump on Johnson’s positive action bandwagon.
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According to Winter, the successful repeal of prohibition required a “general recognition
»87

among more and more people that the hypocrisy of it was unacceptable,

Winter pointed out

that, at the time, this kind of recognition by individual citizens of Mississippi had certainly
grown, especially since previous repeal movements, but a widespread and shared XQCO^Mon of
88

the effects of the law on the states’ image had not yet surfaced,

A shared realization ofthe

negative impact of prohibition was necessary to create a situation in which the legislature had to
act. Legislators very rarely vote to pass any legislation if they feel that their own constituents are
heavily against it. Substantial and widespread popular support, therefore, was essential for a
repeal movement to even begin to have any success. In a way,support for prohibition was
directly linked with an acceptance of the hypocrisy, and, conversely, an appreciation for the
effects the hypocrisy had on the states’ image would create a desire to end the hypocrisy that was
prohibition in Mississippi. The Jackson Country Club raid, in conjunction with Johnson’s
speech, created a concrete rallying point for the growth of a shared realization ofthe basic fact
that hypocrisy existed, and if anyone needed the gaps filled with the details ofthis hypocrisy, the
ensuing courtroom procedures would do just that.

87
88

Interview with William Winter.
Interview with William Winter.

Green 30

Green 31

State of Mississippi vs. Charles Wood

If one were to compile a database of every liquor receipt, every tax form, every business
license, and every letter of every law dealing with liquor in 1966 Mississippi for the purpose of
understanding the reality of prohibition in Mississippi, the collection would surpass the
information present in the ensuing trial of Charles Wood in sheer size only. The State of
Mississippi vs. Charles Wood became the formal name ofthe trial that developed from the raid
on the Jackson Country Club. The evidence presented in this lawsuit by Wood’s attorneys, hired
by the country club, is an exceptionally clear lens through which to view the iimer workings of
prohibition in Mississippi.

Attorneys for Wood sued on behalf of Charles Wood,saying that the affidavit against
Wood for possession of liquor did “not state any offense known to the State of Mississippi” and
the arrest and prosecution violated Wood’s equal protection and due process rights under the
89

state and federal constitutions.

Their basic claim, beyond attempting to get Wood offthe hook,

was that these prohibition laws were being enforced in a discriminatory manner across the state,
and even within individual jurisdictions. Julian Alexander, lead attorney for Wood,would
further attempt to show, through what would amount to nearly 700 pages oftestimony, that the
state’s licensing, taxing, and involvement with the liquor industry had effectively repealed the
prohibition laws in the state of Mississippi.

The trial began on Wednesday, March 9^^ At that time, the liquor laws in Mississippi
consisted of several basic provisions, which J. Alexander and other attorneys for Wood would
attempt to show conflicted with one another. The first and most important ofthese provisions
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was section 2613 of the 1942 Mississippi Code Annotated^ commonly known as the prohibition
law. This law prevented anyone from selling, purchasing, bartering, giving away,keeping, or
possessing liquor within the state of Mississippi. Punishments for first time offenders involved a
fine of between $100 and $500 and/or imprisonment in a county jail for between one week and
three months. These fines and jail time increased until the penalty for third time offenders would
90

receive a sentence of between one and five years in a state penitentiary,

While §2613 was

above and beyond the key statue dealing with alcohol prohibition, there were some fifty more
individual laws that also dealt with liquor issues. These ensuing measures did things like prevent
the transportation of alcohol within the state, allow exceptions for churches, pharmacies, and
91

hospitals, and strictly prevent the advertising of any liquor within the state of Mississippi.

The second aspect of the liquor laws involved the taxation ofthe illegal commodity. The
first tax was a simple sales tax on the “sale ofillegal goods.” Some form ofa sales tax on liquor
had existed since 1932, and as revenue needs increased, the state had increased the tax from 2%
92

to 9% by 1966.

The most infamous version ofthis sales tax was undoubtedly the “black
93

market tax” passed in 1944 and known officially as §10108-01 of the 1942 Mississippi Code.
However, in 1964, the legislature repealed this tax, replacing it with §10112 ofthe 1942 Code,
which levied a 6% sales tax at the wholesale level and a 9% sales tax at the retail level on the
94

sale illegal goods.

The second tax was a liquor excise tax, §10147-03, under the Wholesale
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Compensating Act of 1964. The state levied this tax against anyone importing, using, storing, or
selling liquor in Mississippi but collected it exclusively from wholesalers who first brought the
95

whiskey into the state.

It consisted of a 10% tax based on the purchase price ofthe liquor, but

due to the difficulties involved in gaining access to the prices from individual wholesalers in
Louisiana, the tax came out to an even $4.20 per case of distilled spirits and 75^ per case of
96

Wine.

Since 1964, the Mississippi State Tax Commission was the lucky agency that had the
duty of actually collecting this tax. J. Alexander chose to lead ofFhis testimonies with Robert
Livingston, an employee of the Tax Commission whose job it was to assist in the administration
ofliquor taxes, specifically the excise tax on the wholesalers. The primary function ofthe Tax
Commission was to ensure that as much ofthe liquor that did make its way into the state was
taxed at some level. To accomplish this duty, the agency implemented and continued to abide by
several practices designed to control the flow liquor both into and within the state at both
wholesale and retail levels.

Under §10115 of the 1942 Mississippi Code,for a wholesaler to operate with the
approval ofthe state, he or she would have to apply to the Tax Commission for a permit engage
97

in business, and the subsequent license.

All applicants underwent background checks because,

as Livingston pointed out, the revenue was “too substantial to risk irresponsible people being in
»,98

the business.

This licensing allowed the Tax Commission to keep tabs on exactly where all of
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these wholesalers operated. There was even a section on the apphcation that specifically allowed
for businesses to indicate, on a legal form, that they were going to engage in the hquor business.
**The office,” Livingston testified, “at the same time that it assigns the account number and the
»99

industry code, notes that information of the taxpayer’s application,
a man engaging in the liquor wholesale business was engaging

For all practical purposes,

in a legitimate business.

Retailers likewise had to apply for permits to engage in the retail side ofthe liquor
business. Like the wholesale permits, the Tax Commission provided a section on the permit
application to indicate that the desired business was in the retail liquor sector. The people
involved in the various levels of the liquor industry within the state appear to have been a
relatively responsible group of businessmen. According to Livingston, these liquor dealers were
highly dependable as taxpayers, and the Tax Commission had, to his memory, never had to
revoke any permit belonging to the liquor dealers. When asked what the remedies were to a
hypothetical bad dealer, Livingston responded,“That’s one ofthe things that I haven’t given a
great deal ofthought to because it hadn’t been necessary.

100

Although the excise tax did not apply to liquor at the retail level, the sales tax did, and
thus the Tax Commission had an interest in keeping an eye on the retailers, especially regarding
the source of their liquor. It was in the best interest ofthe state to have its retailers buy
exclusively fi-om Mississippi wholesalers, so that all liquor eventually sold at the retail level had
already gone through state’s filters and the excise tax. Livingston noted that a specific fimction
of his office was to discourage liquor purchases by state retailers from outside wholesalers. “We
want him [the retailer] to buy from MS wholesalers in order that we will know what his volume
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of sales are and thereby determine his correct amount oftax liability,” noted Livingston.
“Should he buy from sources other than these MS wholesalers, we would not have the flow of
»101

information into our office from which we could readily determine his correct tax amount.

Both wholesalers and retailers could simply skimp out on the taxes ifthe state did not know
about the liquor, a situation the state did not want.

The Tax Commission, however, already had a tried and true system by which it could
regulate the flow of“illegal” liquor. Officials never applied the term “contraband” to anything
except untaxed liquor that agents would occasionally find on regular inspections at both
wholesale and retail levels of the liquor industry. The Tax Commission had for some time
essentially deemed the taxed liquor to be ok, whereas the imtaxed liquor was the target ofraids
and seizures. This problem had been around years before the Tax Commission took on the role
of enforcing all the liquor taxes. The difficult part ofthis process was how to stop the retailers
and especially the wholesalers from getting their hands on contraband. The solution came during
William Winter’s term as Mississippi State Tax Collector.

William Winter took the office of Mississippi State Tax Collector in April of 1956, and
this problem of untaxed liquor or simply unpaid taxes immediately confronted him. He recalled
that “approximately one-half ofthe MS liquor dealers who were enjoying the privilege ofbuying
tax-free [liquor] in Louisiana were not paying either the Mississippi Black Market tax or the
>»102

Mississippi sales tax.

At the time, Mississippi still operated under the infamous “black

market tax,” which provided neither enforcement procedures nor the ability to issue permits to
engage in business, two facets of the Livingston’s situation, which greatly assisted him in his
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duties. Officially known as §10108-01 of the 1942 Mississippi Code, the black market tax
provided for a tax of 10% of gross proceeds, based on the selling price, of“any tangible
»103

property, article, or commodity, the sale or distribution of which is prohibited by law.

Enforcement of this tax however, proved to be more difficult than predicted. Ifa seller evaded
the tax the first time, the only enforcement procedure available to the State Tax Collector was to
simply double the tax on the offender, which was likely an ineffective measure, considering that
104

the initial offense already was tax evasion.

Nevertheless, Winter devised a system, with the

help of the Louisiana Department of Revenue, which allowed for an immensely more efficient
control of the liquor flow both into and within the state of Mississippi.

Louisiana, like every other state in the country, was wet, and major liquor distributors
within the state had been selling to Mississippi dealers for years. The overwhelming majority of
liquor that came into Mississippi came from Louisiana, due to the fact that Louisiana had a law
exempting Mississippi dealers from its excise tax as long as the Louisiana dealers informed the
Louisiana Department of Revenue oftheir sales to dealers outside ofthe state. As a result,
Louisiana dealers could offer the product at a lower price, and the neighboring dealers in
Mississippi were all too happy to take advantage of this situation. Rather than attempt to fight it.
Winter simply sought to give the process more transparency and to regulate it with more
efficiency. Winter asked the Louisiana Department ofRevenue as well as the Louisiana
wholesalers to sell exclusively to those dealers in Mississippi who paid the black market tax. He
submitted to the Louisiana Department ofRevenue and the Louisiana wholesalers a list ofthose
dealers within the state of Mississippi that paid the Mississippi liquor taxes. Under Winter’s
arrangement with Louisiana wholesalers “would deny the privilege of buying tax-free in
103
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Louisiana to anyone who was not shown to be complying with the tax laws ofthe State of
»>105

Mississippi.

This system of controlled sales and taxation worked remarkably well, and it quickly
solved the immensely difficult problem of taxing a good, the sale of which was illegal. While
local law enforcement handled retailers. Winter’s office routinely conducted inspections ofthe
larger liquor wholesalers to look for any contraband. Winter employed the use ofLouisiana
liquor stamps in order to identify what liquor had been taxed and what liquor was contraband.
Wholesalers in Louisiana affixed these stamps to the bottles before crossing state borders, so that
the Louisiana Department of Revenue had a clear idea of what liquor to exempt firom its own
excise tax. The Louisiana Department ofRevenue communicated this information to the office
ofthe Mississippi State Tax Collector so that Winter would have shipment sizes, destinations,
and points of entry of all liquor crossing into Mississippi firom Louisiana. Winter taxed the
recipients of the liquor the required ten percent, and if his agency found any bottles without a
stamp upon inspection, they would seize that liquor as contraband. This system ofstamps and
intra-state communication was mutually beneficial to both Mississippi and Louisiana. It created
a situation where consistent business transactions between Louisiana and Mississippi hquor
dealers could flourish with both states benefiting fi-om the taxes, and it allowed for Winter’s
office to successfully control the flow ofliquor within the state ofMississippi.
The efficiency of this method was undeniable. Winter had noted earlier that about half of
the liquor dealers in Mississippi were not paying the black market tax when he first entered
office. By the time he had left office in 1964, the number of Mississippi wholesalers had fallen
from about thirty, to around sixteen to eighteen dealers - approximately one half Winter’s
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arrangement with the Louisiana dealers had effectively solved the problem of untaxed liquor.
Winter did not even have to inspect the retailers of the state, “because,” according to Winter,
insofar as the records available to us would indicate, all ofthe liquor was being purchased by
retailers from the wholesalers in Mississippi from whom we had previously collected the Black
Market Tax.

106

From 1956 through 1963, the number of cases ofliquor brought into the state of
107

Mississippi increased, as shown by the increase in tax revenue indicated on the tax records.

Despite the obvious increase in efficiency in liquor tax collection, the job was still an
arduous one. Winter noted in the testimony that about 95% ofhis time as Mississippi State Tax
Collector was devoted to the collection ofthe black market tax.108 This time for Winter
however, was not wasted, because the office of Tax Collector had no salary. Winter’s payment
came as a ten percent commission oftax collections after he had paid the all others in his office
employed in the collection of these taxes. Livingston’s own office only used three to four people
in 1965, and Winter’s was no bigger. The sheer amount oftax revenue in Mississippi gave
Winter a very comfortable lifestyle, and at one point, he earned roughly $60,000 per year, giving
him the second highest salary among public officials in the country, behind only the President of
109

the United States.

Naturally, Winter’s job was an object ofenvy for many within the state,

and in the 1959 elections for Tax Collector, he had nine opponents. “Everyone wanted thatjob.
110

as Winter said.

Despite being totally contrary to his own interests Winter had advocated the

abolition of the office of Tax Collector for some time, and for the duties of his office to transfer
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to the Mississippi State Tax Commission. “I thought it perpetuated the hypocrisy ofthe sale of
liquor,” Winter said,“and 1 didn’t think it appropriate even though I was the beneficiary ofit.

Winter wanted the duties transferred to the Tax Commission, because the Tax
Commission employees ran on salaries, not on a commission like Winter’s office. Although
Winter wanted what amounted to his job and sustenance transferred to another department,the
Tax Commission, at first, adamantly opposed this switch. According to Winter, the Tax
Commission had been collecting the sales tax on liquor for some time, but they did not want the
„112

duty of collecting the black market tax,“which carried an onus with it.

Although he had long

been opposed to the hypocrisy of the state’s laws. Winter did not call for the revocation ofthe
black meirket tax, but of the transfer ofit out of his office. This maneuver not only suggests
Winter’s desire to see the state’s revenues remain high, but also reflects his desire to see the
repeal of prohibition rather than a repeal ofthe tax. Eventually, the State Tax Commission
agreed to allow the abolition of Winter’s office and to accept its duties. Beginning in January of
1964, William Winter was no longer State Tax Collector, and his former duties of collecting the
black market tax became the job ofthe Mississippi State Tax Commission.

The standards of practice Winter set up as Tax Collector made it simple for Livingston’s
office to continue its effective enforcement. Even when Louisiana stopped using stamps itself,
Livingston’s office simply bought up the leftover stamps at a reduced price, and continued to
require that the dealers pay taxes in order to receive the stamps that made the liquor acceptable to
sell. Livingston’s division, like Winter’s office, also made routine inspections to openly known
wholesale locations to check for contraband. Ironically, although the Mississippi State Tax
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Commission had played a major part in drafting the new Wholesale Compensation Act, it still
had no real authority to make these inspections. Livingston noted that the whole idea of
inspections and seizures of contraband depended on the cooperation ofthe people in the liquor
business.^

It was, quite simply, in their best interest to cooperate. While not to add any aura of

dangerous organized crime to this entirely cozy process, the government acted like an official
mafia for these liquor dealers. All the “legitimate,” or taxpaying, dealers had to do was pay taxes
and comply with inspections, and in return, the state government protected their exclusive right
to sell liquor within the state of Mississippi. By complying with the Tax Commission’s rules and
regulations, this handful of wholesalers could operate on a totally even playing field, with no fear
of outsourced competition.

The Tax Commission s desire to more efficiently collect the taxes and increase revenue
even drove it into providing assistance during the busy season. When the Tax Conunission was
about to transfer the duties of applying the liquor stamps from Louisiana wholesalers to the
Mississippi, it was November of 1964, and the holiday season meant an increase in shipments.
Livingston thus informed the dealers that the Tax Commission would be sending out its own
114

field agents to assist the wholesalers in affixing the stamps to the liquor bottles.

Later, on

December 15, Livingston wrote another letter to the liquor dealers, allowing them to simply
place the stamps on the outside ofthe boxes, so as to avoid opening any wrapped Christmas
115

packages of liquor.

As long as the wholesalers were on their honor not to open the boxes, and

to place as many stamps on the outside as were bottles on the inside, then everything would be
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fine.116 This measure was, according to Livingston,“for [the
dealers’] protection againct unfair
competition of untaxed liquor, as well as a safe-guard for the State’s revenue.””^

As noted, Livingston’s division within the Tax Commission did not have the authority to
actually make seizures in order to protect the “good” dealers jfrom the “bad” ones. Therefore,in
many instances, the Tax Commission had to rely on the local sheriffs to do the enforcement for
them. When the Tax Commission was involved in drafting the Wholesale Compensating Act, it
included a provision that allowed for the sheriff making the seizure up to 50% ofthe proceeds
118

jfrom the state resale of the contraband.

Once seized, the state would essentially put the liquor

up for bidding to no more than three potential buyers, take the lowest bid, and then allow them to
pick it up and move it out of the state as interstate commerce. Unfortunately, as Livingston
noted, the measure for giving sheriffs 50% of the proceeds was highly ineffective in increasing
the supply of contraband seized.

This type of government involvement in the liquor industry extended into county, city,
and other smaller municipalities. City mayors, clerks, sheriffs, and district attorneys from wet
and dry areas all over the state testified, all under subpoena,to exactly how prohibition worked
in their areas ofthe state. In nearly all heavily wet areas, the local government would pass
ordinances that created a local tax on liquor, in addition to the state black market or liquor excise
tax. J.T. Robinson, Natchez Chief ofPolice, would mn background checks on prospective liquor
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dealers, and if he deemed them fit to deal liquor, then their names would go onto a black market
119

list, thus allowing them to sell liquor in Natchez,

Biloxi had various monthly taxes depending

on the size of the dealer and penalties for not paying were miniscule. Prospective dealers came
to an advisory board for permission to sell and received a license after a background check.
Other areas on the coast and along the Mississippi River such as Pascagoula and Vicksburg had
similar situations, and officials testified as so. Even jfrom his home in Jackson, Richard Dortch
recognized that “a sheriff who raided a bar in Vicksburg would have been considered a candidate
,,120

for the asylum.

Quite simply,liquor was completely normal in these areas, and prohibition

was little more than a word.

These dealers, once licensed by the local authorities, had to pay, in addition to any taxes
already paid to the state of Mississippi, a privilege tax to the local municipality. In almost every
case, these local taxes consisted of a fixed monthly fine for wholesalers and another one for
retailers. Chief Robinson had never had to close anyone down in Natchez for failure to pay these
local taxes on liquor, and the only punishment for selling contraband was that the offender had to
apply for permission to be put on his black market list. As far as Robinson was concerned,the
sale of liquor was as normal as the sale of any other commodity. “I think it’s almost legal,” said
„121

Robinson; “I mean it’s been there all my life.

City ofNatchez Assessor and Tax Collector

R.T. Clark placed the number of liquor dealers at forty retailers and two wholesalers, and placed
122

the revenue collected through liquor taxes over an eleven-month period at $24,112.50.

Biloxi

Mayor Daniel Guice pointed out that, while he had been mayor, officials had arrested only one
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man for failing to obtain a license, and city commissioner and clerk Dominic Fallo estimated the
123

number of dealers in Biloxi to be around ninety-two.

Taken together, these local examples showed just what Julian Alexander and the defense
for Wood wanted — that statewide prohibition was enforced in a random and arbitrary manner
within the state of Mississippi. Individual sheriffs dictated the level ofenforcement in their
locale of a statewide law. Wood’s attorneys wanted to prove that Shelton’s decision to raid the
Jackson Country Club fell clearly within this tangled web of arbitrary, and unconstitutional,
enforcement. They also wanted to show how the black market tax had helped cause this
situation. By showing that the tax was detrimental to the equal enforcement ofthe law,the
defense could argue that the State’s involvement with and taxation ofthe liquor industry had
effectively repealed prohibition in Mississippi.

District Attorneys from all over testified that even within their own districts, the laws’
enforcement varied. Furthermore, the conviction rate for charges under the prohibition law was
absurdly low. Jesse Yancey Jr., District Attorney for the 3*^^ Circuit Court District reported that
policies within the counties of Benton, Tippah, Marshall, Union, Lafayette, Calhoun, and
124

Chickasaw varied widely, depending on the sheriff

In one incident in Marshall County where

a man’s whiskey had been seized, Yancey recalled having what he called a “topnotch jury,”
consisting of a policeman, a banker, a doctor, etc. When the man admitted on the stand that the
»125

whiskey had been his, “it was seven to five for an acquittal.

William Waller, District

Attorney for the 7*^ District of Hinds, Madison, and Yazoo Counties, was going on his seventh
year as District Attorney, and even going back to his years in private practice in the 1950s, he
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does not recall there ever having been a jury conviction for the sale or possession ofintoxicating
126

liquor.

Even with Tom Shelton’s renewed efforts to enforce the prohibition laws within his own
jurisdiction, the chances of liquor leaving Hinds County were next to none. Russell Davis, state
legislator from Jackson, admitted to going to a convention with many other legislators where
hard liquor was being served. This convention had no dinner, no banquet, no speech, and no real
127

purpose other than to provide liquor and small sandwiches to its guests.

Private detective

Ralph Day, hired by the defense, observed that liquor moved freely in and out ofHinds County
128

at locations that Shelton himself knew about.

The fact ofthe matter was that, even if arrested.

the likelihood of anyone actually being convicted under the prohibition law was extremely low.
if not non-existent.

Shelton himself felt that the black market tax significantly hurt efforts to enforce the
129

law.

Even if he could raid every roadhouse, dealer,juke joint, and country club in his

jurisdiction, individuals would still get their liquor, and raiding private homes would not only be
foolish and probably illegal, but impossible to actually do. J.A. Travis Jr., prosecuting attorney
for the City of Jackson testified that if officials did decide to raid private homes,“a large
»»130

percentage ofthe citizens of Jackson would be in jail, including me.

Even Paul Alexander,

the prosecuting attorney in the Charles Wood Case, testified that “many ofthe jurymen or
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citizenry would take the position that as long as a person paid all oftheir taxes on whiskey that
»131

neither the possession nor the sale of it was illegal.

The countless number of district attorneys and other officials who testified revealed a
situation where a growing and already large number ofjurors would never return a verdict of
guilty on liquor cases concerning trafficking or selling, because ofthe taxes and licenses issued
to these people by the state government. Wood’s attorneys had shown that the prohibition law,
as a statewide law, was totally ineffective because ofthe black market taxes on liquor. The
enforcement of the law varied from county to county and sheriffto sheriff, but as long as the
state received its revenue, it was happy to allow this patchwork type of enforcement for different
areas to continue. This level of tolerance, taxation, and involvement ofthe state government in
the liquor trade was, in the eyes of the Hinds County Court, enough to merit an implied repeal of
§2613 of the 1942 Mississippi Code.

After several weeks oftestimony and arguments. Hinds County Judge Charles Barber
finally submitted a verdict on Friday, April 8**’. In his opinion the State ofMississippi was
involved in a hypocrisy, which could no longer go ignored. Statutes that prohibited the sale and
possession of alcohol stood in stark contrast with statutes that required permits issued by the
state to sell liquor after having paid taxes on it. Barber pointed out that the evidence showed that
the state of Mississippi had known about the structure ofliquor traffic for some time and that
there was “an inescapable inference that the existence, extent and structure ofthe intoxicating
liquor traffic in the State of Mississippi is known to the Legislature ofthe state, and was known
132

at the time ofthe enactment of the various taxing and licensing statutes,” and is still known.
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Barber established legislative intent by claiming that the legislature was fully aware of what it
was doing when it enacted the various taxation and licensing measures, so as to avoid any
attempt to point towards legislative ignorance as a reason for the passage ofthe black market tax.

Barber pointed to the exact language of §10112, which contained the word “licensed,
and rhetorically questioned whether the use ofthe word ‘license’ by the legislature fully
133

permitted the sale of liquor,

The court’s answer was a clear ‘yes,’ and in Barber’s mind,“the
««I34

intention ofthe legislature [was] absolutely clear.

By enacting these revenue measures.

Barber ruled that the legislature “evinced an intent to permit the sale... ofintoxicating liquors on
»»135

a regulated, revenue producing and licensed basis.

Having found this intent to permit the sale

of liquor on a regulated basis to be factual. Barber continued, saying that “it is further found as a
fact that the intent to permit the sale of intoxicating liquors on this basis is tantamount to an
intent to repeal the provisions of Section 2613” ofthe 1942 Mississippi Code.136

Barber pointed out the contradiction ofa state attempting to prohibit the sale ofa good
and at the same time attempting to derive revenue from it. As Barber put it, “these positions to
»,137

the average and even uneducated eye are irreconcilable.

In the eyes ofthe court, the state’s

attempt to regulate the revenue flows through licensing, and the business ofselling liquor had
»138

been elevated to the same plane ofrespectability as any other business enterprise,

Juries did

not convict on possession or sale ofliquor because it would be comparable,in the eyes of most
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citizens, to convicting someone on the sale of hot dogs. As far as the average citizen was
concerned, liquor dealers and hot dog vendors occupied the same class oftax-paying enterprises.
The only difference was that the sale of liquor was technically illegal. The Director ofthe State
Commission of Budget and Accounting, Earl Evans, even noted that the income from the black
market tax was anticipated revenue that his commission included in the gross sales tax
139

collections, and it later became part of the state’s general fund.

According to Evans, roughly
140

65% of the liquor revenue eventually made its way into state supported educational institutes.
Barber was not pointing to these types of practices as some sort ofshameful money laundering,
but simply as proof that the state’s financial policies did not differentiate the liquor industry from
any other enterprise. The legislature, according to Barber, had repealed prohibition “not in the
„141

name of honest and reasonable regulation, but... in the crass name ofrevenue.

Barber cleared Charles Wood of all charges, saying that he had been convicted under a
now repealed statute. Barber further stated that even ifthe court had not implicitly repealed the
prohibition statute. Wood’s arrest was still the result of“an intentional, deliberate, purposeful
and systematic discriminatory enforcement ofthe law, amounting to a denial to him ofthe
»142

constitutional rights ofthe equal protection ofthe laws.

Despite this rather harsh language.

Barber did not find particular fault with Shelton for attempting to enforce a law. Barber simply
143

described the entire state as a “crazy-quilt pattern” oflocal option enforcement ofprohibition.
The availability of information within all ofthese jurisdictions pertaining to the whereabouts of
liquor was incontestable evidence as to the discriminatory enforcement ofthe law, both at the
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state and local levels. Barber pointed to Shelton’s own testimony that the prohibition statute was
enforced in less than 19% of the county, despite the abundant availability ofinformation
144

pertaining to the whereabouts of liquor, as proofof this discrimination.

Barber clearly felt embarrassed by the liquor situation in Mississippi, and his ruling
reflected his opinion. Despite the likely agreement with the interpretation and ruling by many on
both sides of the temperance fence, the case would naturally be appealed to a higher court, and in
this instance the Hinds County Circuit Court would get the call. After this ruling, some people
began to think the law had been definitively repealed, causing several arrests throughout the state
on liquor charges, and Circuit Judge Russel Moore had to quickly issue a supersedeas orjudicial
order that upheld the prohibition laws until a ruling from the next level ofthe state’s courts,
which would come in early May.
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Legislative Process

While the courts had been hearing testimony and arguments for nearly a month,the
Mississippi legislature had been attempting to create its own solution to the liquor problem since
early February. On February 7^, Senator Bill Carraway of Leland sponsored and introduced
Senate Bill no. 1798, better knowm as the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. This bill was likely
drawn up within Governor Johnson’s office, or at least with the help ofhis office. The bill
contained virtually all measures that Johnson had called for in his State ofthe State Address,
including the March

referendum and state-owned package stores. Almost immediately the

bill underwent a series of seventeen proposed amendments, thirteen of which passed. These
145

amendments began the process of disfiguring the bill away fi*om Johnson’s original plan.

On

February 24^^, SB no. 1798 finally passed 32-17 with a total of54 amendments.

Carraway’s bill, if it could still be called Carraway’s, provided for a referendum to take
place on April 19^^, which would allow the voters ofthe state to choose whether or not to come
out fi*om underneath the state’s prohibition laws. The voters would also have a choice of
whether or not the liquor stores should be state or privately owned, but unlike the 1964
referendum, all voters would have the option to cast their vote on this second facet.
Furthermore, the Senate changed Johnson’s three-man commission, which would have the duty
of overseeing the state’s involvement with liquor. Under Johnson’s plan, he would appoint all
three members to the commission, but the Senate increased the number to nine, giving the
Governor the power to appoint three, the Speaker ofthe House three, and the Lieutenant
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Governor three. Finally, after having created, modified, and approved of all ofthese measures.
146

the Senate also decided to pass a motion that would table the bill for reconsideration later.

Eventually, on March

well after the illuminating testimony in the Wood case

became public, the Senate finally finished reconsidering the bill, passed it 33-18, and it came up
on the House floor on March

Almost a month passed as the House debated this bill, until
148

on April 20^^, the House Temperance Committee re-introduced House Bill no. 112.
Representative Phil Bryant of Lafayette County had originally introduced this bill back on
January 11th, before the governor’s speech, before the raid, before SB no. 1798, and before the
149

Wood trial.

HB no. 112 was essentially the House’s response to what it viewed as a poor

Senate bill (1798). HB no. 112 reaffirmed the state’s commitment to prohibition, but allowed
individual counties to vote themselves out firom under state prohibition ifthey so desired. The
House bill was essentially a local option liquor plan with no referendum and with privately
owned liquor dealers. The House quickly passed their version ofthe bill on April 26 by a count
of 69-50, and the Senate introduced it onto its floor on May 2"^.^^°

May 2"^ continued to be a very eventful day regarding the repeal prohibition. On the
very same day. Circuit Judge Russel Moore upheld Judge Barber’s ruling in the Wood case,
leaving only the State Supreme Court as the remaining obstacle to a total repeal ofprohibition.
Furthermore, the House of Representatives, fearing the Senate Temperance Committee would sit
indefinitely on HB no. 112, decided to act. They began the process of amending SB no. 1798 to
146
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the point that it conformed with HB no. 112 almost exactly. The general bodies ofboth the
House of Representatives and the Senate were wets, or at least were likely in favor ofrepeal, but
151

House wets began to

the Senate Temperance Committee was undoubtedly dry-dominated,

fear a simple refusal to allow the bill to clear committee, so it took action.

Jackson Clarion-

Ledger featured several unconfirmed reports that Governor Johnson himself had even asked
Lieutenant Governor Carrol Gartin to persuade the Temperance Committee to sit on the bill
152

indefinitely, since HB no. 112 had no provisions for a referendum,

By rewriting the Senate

bill to resemble HB no. 112, the House could get around this roadblock, bypass the Temperance
Committee, send the bill back to the Senate, and put it to a general vote. The consensus was that
the original HB no. 112 would pass the senate quickly if it ever cleared the Temperance
Committee. Senator Merle Palmer ofPascagoula estimated that it would take only twenty
153

minutes for the senate to approve the bill if it could only get to the floor,

The House simply

wanted to add another way for the bill to do just that, even if under a different name.

The following day, the House Temperance Committee finished its amendments and
advised the House to pass the revised SB no. 1798. More important, however, was the Supreme
Court’s decision to accept the Wood case, a decision that put immediate and totally new kinds of
pressure on the legislature to act. The race to repeal prohibition was now entering its final leg.
The courts could very likely repeal prohibition entirely, with no restrictions, a very undesirable
circumstance in the eyes of most Mississippians. In early April, Governor Johnson, while

isi

The term “Wets” did not necessarily apply to drinkers. There were plenty ofteetotaling
individuals who favored repeal of state prohibition, including William Winter, but these people
were still considered “wet.” By the same token, there were drinkers who favoered prohibition,
and thus were considered “drys.” These terms served to divide individuals into camps ofpro or
anti-prohibition,
regardless of personal drinking habits.
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proclaiming that he would sign no bill without a referendum, had warned legislators that this
pressure from the courts might very well arrive, and arrive it had. On May 4*,the Attorney
General’s office filed a request to move the Wood case up the docket as soon as possibleaccording to some reports, the court could wind up hearing the case as early as the following
Monday, May

This type of pressure was apparently all the Temperance Committee could handle,
because on the very same day, the Temperance Committee allowed HB no. 112 to clear
155

committee and go to the general floor for discussion and a vote,

Demonstrating the urgency

that characterized the move. Temperance Committee member Sen. Ben Hilbun of Starkville
*>156

sardonically remarked,“We passed it five votes against it and three for it.

The Supreme

Court accepted the Attorney General’s motion and set the court date at May 19*, arguments to
157

begin promptly at 9:30 a.m.

Even if not quite to the extent that some feared, the courts had

justified the Committee’s heightened sense of urgency. The Senate would have at least until
May i9* to make their revisions and vote, but ifthey amended any part ofHB no. 112,then the
House would also require time to deliberate and vote, so while the feared May 9* court date had
passed uneventfully, everyone still understood that ten more days was no huge amount oftime.

The Senate quickly got to work and, despite the predictions of Senator Palmer,the bill
did not pass immediately. Senators primarily found fault with the lack ofa referendum and the
privately owned liquor stores. In an attempt to compromise with the House,the Senate decided
to allow for no referendum but to change the privately owned hquor stores to state owned liquor
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stores. The Senate passed the new revised version ofHB no. 112 by a count of28-17 on May
11^, but because of the changes it had made to the bill, the House would have to concur with the
158

Senate’s changes in order to send the bill to Governor Johnson’s desk.

The House entered the

Senate’s revised HB no. 112 onto its floor the very next day, and on Friday, May 13*,the House,
159

echoing the Senate’s spirit ofcompromise, passed the bill 63-28.

The House had not liked the

state-owned liquor stores, but neither had the Senate found the lack ofa referendum to their
liking. Nevertheless, the two sides decided to make a trade off- no referendum for state-owned
package stores. The bill went to Governor Johnson’s desk the following Monday, May 16*.

Questions quickly rose over whether or not Johnson would actually sign the bill, or if he
might simply allow it to sit for five days and become law without his signature. Speculation
began in early May over whether or not some dry’s, as well as Johnson himself, would support
160

the bill, even without a referendum, because ofthe court pressures,

Earlier, he had made it

clear that he would sign no bill without a referendum, but this proclamation came not only before
the Mississippi Supreme Court had accepted the case, but also before Judge Barber’s initial
ruling in the County Court. The bill sat on Johnson’s desk through the entire week, which
allowed the Supreme Court case ofState ofMississippi vs. Charles Wood to begin on Thursday,
May 19*, with prohibition laws still intact.

Paul Johnson had run for Governor with the basic slogan of“I stood up for you,now
stand up for me,” or “stand tall with Paul,” referring to his fierce stance against civil rights
progress, the integration of the University of Mississippi by James Meredith, and his overall
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segregationist policies.

Johnson’s conservative platform had also included an element of

supporting state prohibition in Mississippi. While he had already lived up to the latter aspect of
his platform two years prior by vetoing a local option attempt, he had again gone after the
hypocrisy of the state’s liquor laws in February of 1966, even proposing an acceptable plan to go
with his attacks. Johnson had likely done this with the intention to veto any measure that did not
meet his specific requirements, as he had done in 1964, but the presence ofthe court cases
severely limited that option, along with his ability “to stand tall.” Johnson had until midnight of
Saturday, May 21^^ to take action on the bill, and speculations went in all directions. One
editorial in the May 21*^ edition of the Jackson Clarion-Ledger stated simply,“I am anxious to
»162

see just who our Governor will be standing for this week.

Despite reports that the ruling in the case might take up to a month, Johnson decided not
163

to chance it and signed the bill into law on Saturday, May 21^*, at 2:12 p.m.

Johnson called it

“the hardest decision I have had to make” and remarked,“I pray to god I have done the right
,A64

thing.

Sources close to Johnson said he had thrown out his requirement for a statewide

referendum because he feared a potential Supreme Court ruling that would leave liquor
165

uncontrolled in Mississippi.

Even Johnson himselfsaid at the signing ofthe bill,‘The real

and present danger of the complete breakdown of enforcement ofthe present prohibition law in
Mississippi... caused me to abandon my request for a state-wide referendum in favor ofthis act
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which meets almost every requirement I outlined.

The pressure from the court case had

gotten to Johnson and forced his hand in the direction ofrepeal.

HB no. 112 had become the Local Option Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. There
would be no referendum, and the State of Mississippi would become the liquor wholesaler for all
dealers within the state. The legislature assigned this particular duty to the Mississippi State Tax
Commission, which had already been enforcing the excise and sales taxes on liquor during
prohibition. Under the new law, the Tax Commission created an Alcoholic Beverage Control
division(ABC)to handle all affairs regarding intoxicating liquors. Prospective liquor dealers
had to apply for permits with ABC in order to sell liquor. This new situation was not
dramatically different from how liquor sales had operated under state prohibition, with the
exception that the permits now required that dealers buy exclusively from the state, in addition to
paying the appropriate taxes. Permits would last for exactly one year, expiring on June 30* of
each year. The law elevated the executive powers of ABC agents to the same level as police
officers in order to facilitate the enforcement ofthe new law. According to the new act, penalties
for purchasing alcohol from sources other than the Tax Commission would result in fines
ranging from $500 to $2,000, not less than six months in jail, and the revocation of a liquor
167

permit.

The new law officially repealed the black market tax by making the tax legal, but the
passage of HB no. 112 did not technically repeal prohibition or §2613 ofthe Mississippi Code.
In the introduction to the law itself, the legislature claimed that the State of Mississippi was still
166
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wholeheartedly behind the enforcement of prohibition, but the law would now allow individual
168

counties to vote their way out from under the prohibition laws.

Beginning July

individual

counties could begin petitioning the Tax Commission for the right to vote on prohibition within
their county. These petitions had to consist of either 20% ofthe voting population or 1,500
voters, whichever number was lower. If counties either did not attempt the petition or voted to
remain dry, then the new law empowered the Governor with the authority to effectively enforce
the prohibition of liquor sales within those counties. The Mississippi Highway Patrol became
the chief agency in enforcing prohibition within the dry counties. If, however,a county decided
to vote itself out from under the liquor laws, then the state would allow the sale, purchase.
trafficking, and possession of liquor within that county.

The signing ofthe bill brought a general wave ofrelief. Although some officials like the
Mayor of Natchez denounced the bill as the beginning ofa socialistic regime in Mississippi,
169

most officials seemed, at the very least, content that some sort ofresolution had passed.

The

Mississippi Sheriffs Association, which had previously praised Johnson for his February speech
denouncing the hypocrisy of the liquor laws, congratulated Governor Johnson on his signing of
170

the alcohol bill.

District Attorney A. Boyce Holleman said, “I believe the Governor’s decision
„171

will put us on the right track.

Speaker ofHouse Walter Sillers, who was one ofthe few

officials present at the signing, took the pen that Johnson used to sign the bill and congratulated
»172

the Governor, telling him “I want to shake your hand.

168

The passage ofthe bill meant that the

The phrase “voting out from under prohibition laws” was a phrase used in the newspapers of
the era, especially in pro-wet advertisements. It is not an invention ofthe author and simply
refers to counties voting to become wet.
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liquor situation was at least secure for the moment. The Supreme Court could reaffirm the ruling
ofthe two lower courts in the Wood case without any real danger of uncontrolled liquor within
the state. As it turned out, the Supreme Court actually reversed and remanded the decisions of
the two lower courts on June 13*^.

Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court was Tom Brady, author ofthe infamous
book. Black Monday, which dealt with the implications of a United States Supreme Court ruling
that outlawed segregation in public schools. Brady was very much concerned with states’ rights
as they pertained to preserving the segregated status quo in Mississippi, and he feared the power
ofthe courts to usurp legislative authority. He ruled, and all justices concurred, that the
juxtaposition of prohibition of liquor and taxes on liquor was not repugnant and that the state
legislature had every right to tax an illegal commodity without implicitly legalizing that
commodity. Brady claimed that one could not “by the wildest stretch ofthe imagination arrive at
the conclusion...that it was the intention ofthe legislature, by the severe taxing ofthis illegal
,»173

commodity, to repeal the prohibitions ofsection 2613, either directly or by implication.

Brady further ruled that Wood had not been the victim of arbitrary and random applications of
the law. He cited Shelton’s unusual effort to enforce the prohibition laws equally within his
jurisdiction, as well as the fact that “mere laxity in the administration ofthe law... cannot be held
,»174

to be a denial ofthe equal protection ofthe law.

While Brady conceded that all officers of

the law are technically officers ofthe state, he said that enforcement practices are countyspecific, and thus one could not view random enforcement statewide as statewide discrimination.
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Considering that the Supreme Court’s mling would really change nothing in the wake of
the passage ofHBno. 112, Brady essentially used this trial as an outlet for a pohtical rant on the
powers of courts, the use ofjurisprudence, and judicial restraint. He, along with the rest ofthe
»175

court, “emphatically [declined] to usurp legislative prerogative.

Using quite lofty language.

Brady claimed that beyond the specific liquor issue “there is... involved in this case a question of
grave importance which transcends all others affecting the basic operations ofour State
>,176

Government.

Brady, in his opinion at least, was simply using this case as a platform to

bolster his own perspective that courts should stay out of Mississippi’s business. Despite
Brady’s desires, there was no issue of whether courts had the right to usurp legislative power.
Courts had long held the right to judicial review, and Judges Barber and Moore had previously
gone to great lengths to establish legislative intent in their own mlings. The rhetoric ofnot
shrinking from the duty of interpreting rather than re-writing laws was wholly unnecessary to the
decision making process of the court, and the perversely self-aggrandizing nature of much ofthe
opinion is almost comical. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not rule in favor of Wood,did
not overturn an already modified prohibition law, and the specific misdemeanor charges against
Wood went back to the County Courts for further review.

Even after these court rulings, the liquor issue was still far away from any resolution.
The individual counties had to hold elections, and the state had one month to set up the state
wholesale location, purchase enough liquor to stock it, hire workers, and generally set up the
infrastructure to run a state-wholesale liquor operation. On June 1^\ Governor Johnson
appointed Earl Evans, previously head ofthe State Commission ofBudget and Accounting, as
head of the State Tax Commission’s new Alcoholic Beverage Control Division. ABC purchased
175
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an old warehouse in Jackson as the site for a base of wholesale operations and began accepting
applications for retail licenses on June 13^, the same day that the Mississippi Supreme Court
made its final decision.

Perhaps the most interesting period ofthe state’s repeal of prohibition came during the
month of June. Beginning on June

the state, with the full backing and support of Governor

Johnson, would go completely dry until counties voted themselves out from imder prohibition, a
process that would begin a month later. Ironically, this interim was probably the driest
Mississippi had ever been under the prohibition laws, despite the fact that the dry-up was the
result of the repeal of prohibition. Under the new law. Governor Johnson had the authority to
use the Mississippi Highway Patrol in enforcement of liquor laws, and the provision was highly
effective.

On July

Harrison County became the first coimty in Mississippi to petition for a

177

vote.

Liquor was still illegal in every county until that county voted itself out from under

prohibition, but agents would no longer pour out any seized liquor but rather they would simply
178

keep it and add it to the inventory at ABC’s warehouse in Jackson,

The individual county

campaigns varied in both direction and intensity. The counties along the Mississippi River and
the Gulf Coast had relatively one-sided campaigns that favored repeal, while other, traditionally
more conservative counties, simply did not even petition to hold a vote. One ofthe more
intriguing battles took place within the capital city’s own Hinds County.

The Hederman Brothers owned the Jackson Clarion-Ledger at the time ofthe repeal of
prohibition, and these four brothers held influential ties within the power structure ofthe State of
177
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Mississippi. According to Richard Dortch and Brunini, Jr. another one ofEd Brunini’s major
179

contributions to the repeal effort was to get the Hederman brothers on board.

The devoutly

religious nature of these Baptist brothers placed them heavily in the dry camp; however,like
Brunini, these brothers were also exceptionally civic-minded individuals, wanting general
progress for the State of Mississippi and the city of Jackson. As Dortch recalls, it became widely
known that the Hedermans supported the repeal of state prohibition, and this recognition may
ISO

have helped hasten a repeal process already hastened by a looming court case,

As wets in the

legislature had used the pressure of the courts to force major amendments onto Johnson’s plan
and to ultimately trap Johnson into signing HB no. 112, several influential individuals on the
outside like Brunini and the Hederman’s had simultaneously worked to make sure that the
ultimate bill was an acceptable compromise. According to Dortch, Winter, Hewes, and Brunini
Jr., the most significant consequence ofthese negotiations was the acceptance by many drys of
the repeal of statewide prohibition, in exchange for a ban on liquor advertising within the
181

state.

Many of these measures, now known as the blue laws, still exist today.

Throughout the repeal process, the Jackson Clarion-Ledger still maintained the face of a
pro-prohibition newspaper, but the Hederman brothers allegedly were not using their own
personal influence for the same purpose. Once HB no. 112 passed however, both the brothers
182

and the newspaper went immediately over to the dry camp for Hinds County,

“Vote dry” ads

appeared in the Jackson Clarion-Ledger virtually every day until after the actual vote, and the
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recurring theme was that a dry vote was a vote “for the sake of our children.”^^^ A group
formed much earlier in the repeal process, called “United Drys,’* spearheaded the dry campaign,
and Pastor David Grant of Broadmoor Baptist Church in Jackson was the chairman.^^"^ Zach
Hederman even attempted to have his membership to the Downtown Jackson Association of
roughly $78 per month reduced to $5 per month, because the Downtown Jackson Association
was spending money to support a vote to end prohibition in Hinds County. The association
185

politely refused.

Julian Alexander, former lead attorney for Charles Wood in his now famous Hquor case,
became the Executive Director of Mississippians For Legal Control, the group advocating a wet
vote for individual counties. Through their considerably less numerous ads,they hoped to
convince as many counties as possible, particularly Hinds,to vote wet. On July 16*, Harrison
and Washington counties became the first counties to vote wet, and for the first time in nearly
sixty years, liquor was legal in Mississippi. However, many ofthe state’s counties, including
nd

Hinds, had set August 2

as the date of their local referendum on liquor.

Twenty-three counties voted that day on whether or not to remain dry or become wet.
Nineteen chose to become wet, bringing the total number of wet counties to twenty-seven. Pike,
Lincoln, Jeff Davis, and Attala counties also became the first counties to vote to remain dry
under the new state liquor laws. For its part. Hinds County chose to become wet. Despite the
intense dry campaigning, the final tally was over 20,000 for liquor in Hinds and just over 14,000
for dry. According to the papers, this election drew the largest polling numbers ever for an
183
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election in the First Judicial District of Hinds County.

Interestingly, this wet/dry vote within

individual counties was the first time many black Mississippians had ever voted in an official
187

election, and black participation was quite high.

In fact, the two most heavily wet polling

stations were the Covenant Presbyterian Church in northeast Jackson(an all white polling
location), and the box at the Fortification Street fire station, which contained the highest
188

concentration of black voters in the Hinds County liquor referendum.

Over the next several months, more counties would slowly but smely vote their way out
fi*om under the prohibition laws of the state. Through 2007,the State of Mississippi has fortyeight wet counties and thirty-four dry ones, and eight ofthose dry counties have never voted.
Prohibition still technically remains on the books, and the “crazy-quilt” pattern ofliquor laws is
still in effect from county to county as far as how liquor is sold. As far as revenue goes, this
system is one of the most efficient and well-run systems that the state government has and has
189

gone virtually unchanged since its inception in 1966.

The question still remains,though, of

what event or which person(s) to credit with the establishment ofthis system ofliquor laws. The
small amount of scholarship on the topic leans heavily in favor of awarding Governor Johnson
the majority of the credit, but careful examination ofthe players, the background ofthe repeal
movement, the events and their chronology lends itself to a different interpretation. While
Governor Johnson’s role is by no means to be discarded, the impact ofthe raid on the Jackson
Country Club and the subsequent trial deserves more attention as the leading catalyst to the
repeal of prohibition in 1966.
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Conclusions and Implications

Paul Johnson’s role in this episode of Mississippi history resembled the role of a
politician more so than an idealistic leader. His function as a leader came at the outset ofthe
repeal process, when he courageously called out the hypocrisy of Mississippi’s liquor laws, and
Johnson’s initial February 2"*^ speech was certainly courageous and influential in its own way.
For the head of a state to call out the hypocrisy of an institution, which he himself voted to
maintain merely two years prior, is an undeniably bold action. Nevertheless, while the
willingness of Johnson to take on the role ofleading the state out ofthe hypocrisy ofprohibition
is admirable and potentially critical in actually dealing with the liquor issue,the way in which
events transpired minimize the importance ofthis first move by Johnson. Of all the results of
Johnson’s speech, the aspect most crucial to the eventual repeal ofprohibition in Mississippi was
that he put the liquor issue in the front of everyone’s mind, but even a heightened mass
awareness of an issue does not guarantee any particular undertaking to resolve the issue. In
answering the question of whether Governor Paul Johnson played a role in the repeal of
prohibition on Mississippi, the answer must be a definitive yes. However,the answer must be an
equally definitive no when asking whether or not Johnson played the critical role in the repeal of
prohibition.

Johnson’s stand on prohibition created a stir among the people of Mississippi and the
legislature. A large portion of this reaction seems to have been an attempt to simply attach more
substance behind a repeal movement. Wets needed something concrete at which to point in
order to encourage a mass support of prohibition-repeal, and they quickly latched onto Johnson’s
stand as a concrete starting point for a repeal movement. Furthermore, while Johnson’s speech
did help this sort of re-awakening ofthe liquor issue, it did not suddenly open the public’s
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heretofore-closed eyes to the hypocrisy of Mississippi’s liquor laws. As previous repeal attempts
show, people had been aware of Mississippi’s liquor hypocrisy for some time. Even in 1966,
two legislators had already put bills on their respective floors in an attempt to initiate some sort
of positive action on prohibition.

This speech, partly because of its timing, seems to receive much ofthe praise forjumpstarting the repeal movement, and thus Governor Johnson seems to likewise receive much ofthis
credit. However, it must be remembered that simply because Johnson’s speech preceded the raid
on the Jackson Country Club does not place it at a higher level ofimportance than the ensuing
trials. Leadership is always important in creating movements and changing conventions, but the
heightened re-awakening of liquor hypocrisies in Mississippi would not have been as widespread
if not for the raid. Governors make speeches all ofthe time where they outline key issues to
address in the coming year, and most people end up picking and choosing which issues to follow.

Once the public, and especially the media, got wind ofthe raid, the wets virtually
abandoned Johnson’s initial stance as the concrete pillar on which to rest their arguments and
pointed to the threat of uncontrolled liquor as the reason to repeal prohibition. Beyond the
ensuing court cases, the raid itself played an important role as a catalyst for the repeal of
prohibition. The national media attention that this raid received did more to disturb Mississippi’s
comfort with its prohibition laws than had any other previous single event. Governor Winter
recalled a general feeling among those concerned with how the prohibition laws affected the
state’s image that something dramatic needed to happen to push citizens and legislators into
190

calling for a repeal.

190

This raid made the “thinking citizens,” as Governor Johnson described

Interview with William Winter.
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them, see that the rest of the country viewed the state as the laughing stock ofthe nation
191

regarding its treatment of liquor.

On an even more basic level, the raid simply rocked the boat and generated a feeling of
uneasiness in the capital city. Many people across the state were at least content with the liquor
laws. The drys had prohibition, but those who wanted to drink had their hquor. Some state
officials went as far as saying that individuals, including wets, were happy with the situation.
When a brewery lobbyist spoke to a federal House of Representatives commerce committee in
1954, he said that everyone in Mississippi was happy; the state had the tax, the wets had hquor,
and the drys had prohibition. Representative John Bell Williams,the only Mississippian on the
»»192

committee, responded that the man “was telling the truth.

Something had to upset this

acceptance of the status quo for a change to occur. In past repeal attempts, even drinkers had
voted dry for one or more of several reasons, but the availability ofliquor was the circumstance
that allowed these drinkers to continue to vote wet. In this situation, people were going to drink,
regardless of the laws, but if they did not fear retribution for drinking, then there was no reason
to even begin to advocate a change in the laws, no matter how repugnant the combination of
taxes and prohibition may have seemed. Only fears of actual limitations on drinking would force
the numerous supporters of the status quo into advocating a change in the laws. The raid on the
capital city’s social event of the season exposed these fears as real possibilities and generally
upset the status quo far more than Johnson’s speech had done only a few days prior.
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Many people grossly underestimated what would happen as a result ofthe raid.

No

one really underestimated the role that Johnson was to play in the repeal movement The raid,
like Johnson’s initial speech, had shock value, but unlike Johnson’s speech, it also had staying
power. When local and national newspapers reported major developments in Mississippi’s
prohibition saga in March, April, May, and late into August, they still referenced the raid rather
than Johnson’s speech. In 1986, twenty years after the repeal ofprohibition, reflective articles
on Mississippi’s history with liquor have titles such as “Raid on country club led to legalized
liquor sales.

194

And while it is true that the value of an event to the media does not necessarily

correspond with its historical importance, the roles that both Johnson and the raid played in the
repeal process shared a common need for media attention. Media attention was essential for
these two related events to work their magic in creating a general dissatisfaction with the status
quo.

In the end, the Mississippi legislature was the architect ofthe repeal ofprohibition, and it
is to the legislature that one must look when deciding which event, if any, most spurred it to
action. Looking at Johnson’s initial proposal, as compared to the final bill, the differences alone
are enough to merit an argument that the legislature paid very little attention to his desires. The
original Senate bill, introduced with his policy, quickly imderwent fifty-four amendments, which
made it almost unrecognizable. Even with the referendum, Johnson found SB no. 1798’s lack of
highway patrol enforcement powers, as well as the nine-man commission, wholly
195

unacceptable.

The “weak-govemor” doctrine in Mississippi is nowhere more evident than in

this attempt to expand the three-man liquor commission to nine men. At the time, the governor.
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lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house were the three most powerful offices in Mississippi
politics, and the desire that these three men have three appointees each to the a nine-man hquor
commission reflects this power structure of the era. Johnson’s power in general was not all that
impressive, and subsequently, his capacity to act as a driving force for the repeal of prohibition
was not all that great. This capacity to lead through totally self-directed action suffered even
more setbacks after the Wood trial began to make its way through the court system.
Nevertheless, Johnson knew that something had to get done, and after SB no. 1798 had gone to
the house, he urged the House to get going on the bill, or the courts would do theirjobs for
196

them.

Johnson clearly saw the pressure ofthe Wood case as looming over the entire process,

and the acknowledgement of this pressure coincided with a decrease in his own control over the
process.

The House, as events would show, was not entirely behind the Senate bill, especially the
referendum. The adage of the day was that, if the state opted to solve the Hquor question through
referendum, then the voters of the state would drunkenly stagger to the polls and vote dry. The
two previous referenda supported this concern ofthe wets. Unfortimately for House wets,
Johnson, on the same day he urged the House to get moving, had proclaimed that he would sign
no bill without a referendum. This proclamation put the wets in a sticky situation until Judge
Barber sent them a gift-wrapped justification to take the referendum away from the Senate bill.
Once Barber had ruled that the legislature, through its tax laws on liquor, had implicitly repealed
prohibition, the race was on to see if the court would continue to rule in favor ofimplicitly
repealed prohibition and leave liquor uncontrolled in Mississippi.
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As a result of this initial ruling, the House decided to simply scrap SB no. 1798, and
instead to re-introduce HB no. 112, and it passed on April 26*. The only problem was that, even
though the Senate, as a w hole body, was likely in favor of not having a referendum,the Senate’s
Temperance Committee was dry-dominated. Johnson supposedly advised the Senate
Temperance Committee to sit on the House Bill because he found the lack of a referendum to be
unacceptable. The House’s attempt to bypass this committee coincided with the circuit court
ruling, and the Mississippi Supreme Court accepted the case on the following day. May 3”*. The
May 4* release of HB no. 112 from committee to the floor is indicative ofthe pressure that the
Wood case had placed on the legislature to act, even if it meant acting directly in the face of
Governor Johnson. Even if Johnson had not urged the Temperance Committee to stall the House
bill, this action still reflects a general disregard for one of his key requirements for repeal: the
referendum.

In 1964, Johnson had vetoed a bill, simply because the referendum did not sit well with
him, and a bill with no referendum whatsoever would have stood no chance to pass. It stands to
reason, therefore, that without any extra-legislative pressures, Johnson would have followed this
trend of vetoing, as well as his own April 1"‘ proclamation that he would sign nothing without a
referendum. With the pressure ofthe courts however, both Johnson and wet legislators knew
that the situation had changed radically. Johnson had essentially trapped himselfin a pohtical
no-win situation. Everyone knew that, despite the best efforts ofstaunch drys to rectify the
liquor hypocrisy, the black market tax was going nowhere. The state simply depended too
heavily on the massive amounts of revenue that liquor generated for its annual budget. The only
solution then was either to actually enforce prohibition or to legalize liquor. The threat ofthe
Supreme Court repealing prohibition made choosing the option to actually enforce prohibition

L
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too dangerous to consider for most politicians, Johnson included. The only option left therefore,
was to legalize liquor, and the wets wanted to ensure this path by making sure that no popular
referendum could stand in the way of repeal.

When the Senate and House eventually passed HB no. 112 and put it on the governor’s
desk, the timing was such that the Supreme Court would begin hearing the Wood case arguments
within the time allotted to Governor Johnson to sign, veto, or sit on the bill. This dramatic timing
poignantly illustrates how the Charles Wood court cases had totally taken over the repeal
movement from Johnson. The hearings loomed in the near future as Johnson thought about what
he wanted to do about the bill. Johnson’s desire for a referendum, as much as it was a genuine
desire to let the people decide, was a self-promoting political move. He was out to maintain his
political image, and even Allen says that the hard-line requirement for a referendum was,in part,
197

a political move to shift the burden of blame away from him in the event ofrepeal,

Johnson

had run on a platform that included a platform ofsupporting prohibition, and for him to sign a
bill that legalized liquor was a total reversal of his policy. Once the Supreme Court actually
began to hear the case, the pressure got to Johnson, and even Johnson admitted that his fear of
198

what might happen in the courts caused him to abandon his requirement for a referendum.

In

one of the few genuinely leader-like moves that Johnson made during the repeal process, he
actually signed the bill, rather than letting it sit for eight more hours and become law without his
signature.

Johnson did not spur or lead the legislature. He signed what the lawmakers gave him,
and once the Barber ruling came out, he immediately became a reluctant leader in the repeal
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process. The raid itself gave Mississippi wets a concrete event through which to gather support
for repeal, and the resulting media sensation, which exposed the hypocrisy of Mississippi’s
liquor laws at the premier social event of the season, drove many fence-sitters into the clear
repeal camp. The threat of the courts’ potential repeal of prohibition was the driving force
behind both the legislative process, and the executive approval ofHB no. 112, which gave the
state of Mississippi the local-option liquor control laws that survive to this day. On September 1,
1966, Judge Charles Barber, the same Hinds County judge who had first implicitly repealed
prohibition, acquitted Charles Wood of all criminal charges, citing as the reason, a recent U.S.
199

Supreme Court Case that demanded stricter search and seiziue practices.

Johnson’s fears of political retribution fi*om those drys that had formerly supported him
were unfounded except in two cases. After Governor John Bell Williams succeeded Johnson in
1968, Paul Johnson attempted to run for Lieutenant Governor; the man who had ended 58 years
ofliquor hypocrisy in Mississippi did not even make the second ballot. In an eerily ironic twist
offate, the man who, in a way, began the repeal process was the other individual directly
affected by the liquor controversy of 1966. Tom Shelton ran for the position of Hinds County
Sheriff in 1967. Twenty years later, when asked about the result ofthat election, Shelton grinned
„200

and said,‘T got the fire beat out of me.

The end of prohibition in Mississippi, to many ardent drys, seemed to signal an end to an
age of morality in the state. Times were changing in 1966 Mississippi, and the repeal of
prohibition is one of many lenses through which to view this transition into modernity. At the
time, the eyes of the nation focused on the volatile civil rights movement in the South, the
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consequences of which still resonate to this day in the state. While feelings about race relations
in the 1960’s were and remain far more divisive than any contemporary feelings would have
been about the state’s liquor situation, these more accessible modem emotions are a useful tool
for understanding the stance of many anti-prohibitionists at the time ofrepeal. The
embarrassment and shame still felt by many modem Mississippians about what happened in their
state in the 1960’s regarding civil rights is akin, at the most abstract ofpossible levels, to the
embarrassment felt by civic-minded individuals in 1966 about the blatant hypocrisy ofthe state’s
liquor laws. The logic behind separate but equal institutions seemed to hail from the same
backwards twilight zone as the logic behind outlawing an item but collecting a tax on it at the
same time. Since 1908, “prohibition” had been part of life in Mississippi, but “prohibition’ was
little more than a word in many parts of the state.

Prohibition in Mississippi was one of many archaic institutions, customs,laws, and
ideals, which eventually backfired on tlie state in the 60s. A general history of Mississippi for
most people essentially consists of a history oftwo decades, separated by a hundred years: the
1860’s and the 1960’s. As unfortunate as this practice is for the state’s image,the importance of
these decades in the overall history ofthe United States merits nothing less than this historical
emphasis. As a microcosm of this crucial time of change for the state, the exact workings ofhow
the outdated institution of prohibition came to an end offers a glimpse into an era, which still
seeks an explanation.

A common misconception, especially among younger generations, is that prohibition
ended in 1966 because Mississippi ratified the 2P‘ Amendment. Mississippi never ratified the
Amendment - it might never. Prohibition finally came to an end because the embarrassment
of enough members in a society finally met with a blend of executive, legislative, and judicial
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pressure to end a practice that was causing further devastation an already heavily besieged state
image. The most critical aspect of these three influences was undoubtedly the raid on the Jackson
Country Club. Once Tom Shelton and his men began to break down the doors behind the bar,
the tables had turned against the forces of dry in Mississippi. Shelton himself, despite the fact
that he was an ardent dry, had to admit that the raid, a result of his actions, got prohibition
: 201

repealed in Mississippi.

The liquor laws established in 1966 have remained largely unchanged since their
inception, due primarily to their immediate and long-lasting effectiveness. In 1967,the State of
Mississippi made just over $11 million from combined sales and revenue. Forty years later, the
State collected over $82 million under virtually the exact same laws and practices developed in
1966, and roughly $57.3 million went directly into the state’s general fund for the 2007 fiscal
year. Over the now forty-one year history of legalized liquor, the State of Mississippi has
collected over $1.7 billion from alcohol sales and collections, destroyed over 3,000 illegal
202

whiskey distilleries, and sold over 77 million cases of liquor,

At least for now,the “oil of

conversation” seems to have found a profitable place next to the “devil’s brew.”^°^

201

Maine {Clarion-Ledger^ Sept. 14, 1986) — Shelton said ofthe raid’s role in repealing
rohibition: “I don’t think there’s any question that the raid did it.”
02
Mississippi State Tax Commission, Office ofAlcoholic Beverage Control
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